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Managers make strategy revision judgments, which are judgments that affect how well the firm 
can revise its strategy when new information comes to light. Using two studies, my dissertation 
examines how formatting the firm’s strategy as a strategy map affects two types of strategy 
revision judgments. First, I study middle managers’ judgments on passing along new information 
to upper management. Second, I study managers’ judgments of the relevance of new information 
and the appropriateness of the firm’s strategy.  
In my first study, I find that middle managers are more likely to withhold new 
information from upper management when they feel that information would be less impressive to 
upper management. Middle managers also tend to punish their subordinates with less positive 
performance evaluations when the subordinates provide them with such less impressive 
information. However, middle managers with sufficient experience who receive a strategy map 
are more likely to pass along such less impressive information to upper management than those 
with comparable experience who do not receive a strategy map. In my second study, I find that 
receiving a strategy map improves managers’ judgements of the relevance of new information. I 
also find that receiving a strategy map improves managers’ judgments about the appropriateness 
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of the firm’s strategy in light of this new information. However, I find this latter effect depends 
on whether it is easy to understand the cause-and-effect relationships depicted in a strategy map.  
Finally, in an extensions chapter, I propose three neuroimaging studies that extend the 
above studies. One of these neuroimaging studies more fully describes the motivation, theory, 
and method of the study. This study approaches the relationship between strategy maps and 
strategy revision differently, extending prior research that suggests a strategy map leads workers 
to better allocate effort between short-term focused and long-term focused activities. I hope to 
provide evidence on the neural processing, and thus the thought processes, that underlie this prior 
finding. Such evidence would improve practitioners’ predictions of how long the effect would 
persist over time, which informs practitioners about whether to revise the firm’s strategy to 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
A firm’s strategy is a plan of action that is expected to move the firm “from its present position 
to a desirable but uncertain future position” (Kaplan and Norton 2001a, 176). Managers often 
invest substantial resources to develop a strategy that is likely to move the firm toward a desired 
future state. Managers must then revise the firm’s strategy as new information comes to light and 
as circumstances change. Otherwise, the firm will likely veer off the path toward its desired 
future state. This dissertation examines how the presentation format of the firm’s strategy affects 
managers’ ability to implement necessary strategy revisions. I examine this through two separate 
experiments, focusing on a widely-used format for presenting the firm’s strategy: a strategy map. 
A strategy map is a chain of strategic goals that are joined together by arrows to communicate 
that one goal causes the next. These cause-and-effect relationships communicated by a strategy 
map are called causal linkages. Ultimately, my two studies provide evidence that a strategy map 
can improve managers’ ability to revise the firm’s strategy when necessary, if the strategy map 
meets certain criteria. 
In my first study, I find that middle managers tend to withhold information from upper 
management when that information contradicts the firm’s strategy. I then investigate whether 
receiving a strategy map helps alleviate this biased treatment of information that contradicts the 
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firm’s strategy.1 Upper management relies on middle managers to pass along information from 
lower levels of the firm. Without such information, upper management will have a more difficult 
time evaluating and revising the firm’s strategy (Kaplan and Norton 2008; Dutton et al. 1997). In 
the absence of a strategy map, I find that middle managers are less likely to pass along 
information to upper management when that information contradicts the firm’s strategy because 
they believe that such information is less impressive to upper management. I also find evidence 
that middle managers tend to evaluate their subordinates’ performance less positively when the 
subordinates provide middle managers with information that contradicts the firm’s strategy than 
when the subordinates provide information that supports the firm’s strategy. These are troubling 
findings because upper management needs information that contradicts the firm’s strategy—even 
more than information that supports the strategy. Top managers are likely already convinced that 
the firm’s current strategy is the right strategy, thus, it is more difficult to convince them that a 
change is necessary than that the firm’s current course is optimal (see Huelsbeck et al. 2011).  
I find that experienced middle managers (i.e. ≥ 2 years of management experience) are 
more likely to pass along to upper management information that contradicts the firm’s strategy 
when they receive a strategy map than when they do not receive a strategy map. Using mediation 
analysis, I find that this is because experienced middle managers who receive a strategy map 
believe that such contradictory information is more impressive to upper management than 
experienced middle managers who do not receive a strategy map. This result suggests that upper 
                                                 
1 Throughout Section 3, I refer to middle managers withholding knowledge, rather than information. This is because 
I conduct Study 1 using the tradition of prior research on knowledge sharing (e.g. Hwang et al. 2009; Jensen and 
Meckling 1992). However, I refer to middle managers withholding information, rather than knowledge, in the 
remaining sections of this dissertation (e.g. Section 1, Section 2, and Section 6). This is done to align the findings of 
Study 1 to the more general questions of how managers use information for strategy revision. Thus, for the purposes 
of this dissertation, knowledge and information are used interchangeably. 
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management is better able to appropriately revise the firm’s strategy when they provide middle 
managers with a strategy map, assuming the middle managers have sufficient experience. 
Interestingly, I do not find that receiving a strategy map affects middle managers’ bias in their 
evaluation of subordinates’ performance.  
In my second study, I test whether a strategy map improves, first, managers’ judgments 
of how relevant new information is for revising the firm’s strategy and, second, their judgments 
of whether that new information suggests the firm’s strategy is appropriate or inappropriate. Both 
judgments affect how accurately managers can use new information in strategy revisions, but 
judgments about the appropriateness of the firm’s strategy can have a stronger effect on strategy 
revision. This is because poor judgments of information relevance can lead managers to discard 
relevant information and erroneously consider irrelevant information, but such poor judgments 
do not directly lead them down the wrong strategic path. In contrast, poor judgments of firm 
strategy appropriateness directly lead managers to pursue courses of action that exacerbate 
existing mismatches between the firm’s strategy and the business environment, i.e. making it 
more likely that inappropriate strategies are kept and appropriate strategies are changed.  
Cheng and Humphreys (2012) find that receiving a strategy map improves both of the 
above judgments, but other prior research suggests that the effects of a strategy map can depend 
on causal linkage strength (see Webb 2004). Causal linkages are strong when it is easy to 
understand why the cause leads to the effect (Luft 2004 outlines several reasons firms have 
difficulty creating strong causal linkages). As such, I manipulate two features of a strategy map 
in my second study: the presence of a strategy map’s causal linkages and the strength of those 
causal linkages. I find that the causal linkages of a strategy map, regardless of their strength, 
improve managers’ judgments regarding the relevance of new information (like Cheng and 
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Humphreys 2012). However, I then find that only strong causal linkages improve managers’ 
judgments about the appropriateness of the firm’s strategy. In one subsample, weak causal 
linkages even lead to worse judgments about the appropriateness of the firm’s strategy. These 
results suggest that a strategy map effect discovered by prior research depends on strong causal 
linkages, specifically a strategy map effect that improves managers’ judgments related to 
strategy revision.  
My two studies, combined, support Kaplan and Norton’s (2008) suggestion that receiving 
a strategy map benefits a firm by improving the type of information managers receive and the 
judgments they make once they receive this information. That is, a strategy map benefits a firm 
by improving managers’ strategy revision judgments. The first study shows how a strategy map 
helps information flow in a less biased manner to decision makers and the second study shows 
how a strategy map helps decision makers recognize relevant new information and inappropriate 
strategies, given that new information. I note that neither study finds the effect of a strategy map 
to be a night-and-day reversal from bad judgments to good judgments. Instead, both effects are 
incremental and most likely occur at the margin. That said, I believe my findings are still 
economically significant. First, judgments about new information are pervasive and constant. 
New information is continuously arriving and managers must continuously respond to that new 
information by making judgments like those examined in this dissertation. Therefore, even an 
improvement at the margin of each judgment could substantially improve a firm’s ability, over 
time, to stay on track toward its desired future state in the face of a changing business 
environment. Second, managers’ strategy revision judgments can have enormous economic 
implications. Kaplan and Norton (2008) highlight new information’s role in “Intel’s switch from 
memory chips to microprocessors, Honda’s shift in emphasis from motorcycles to automobiles, 
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and 3M Corporation’s marketing of Post-it notes” (275). When new information suggests a 
major revision to the firm’s strategy, managers’ judgments related to that information have 
outsized financial effects, making even minor improvements economically significant. 
This dissertation also includes a proposed extensions chapter in which I propose three 
studies that use neuroscience theory and neuroimaging techniques to extend the two studies 
described above. I develop one of these three proposals into a proposed study that lays out the 
motivation, hypotheses, and method with sufficient detail that the proposed study could feasibly 
be executed soon after completion of this dissertation. This proposed study seeks to shed light on 
how thought processes change when a strategy map is provided. Farrell et al. (2012) find that a 
strategy map improves how workers allocate their effort between long-term focused and short-
term focused activities. My proposed neuroimaging study has implications for the persistence of 
this effect over time because some thought process changes are likely to be more persistent than 
others. 
This proposed study differs from my first and second study, because it addresses a 
different aspect of the relationship between a strategy map and strategy revision. My two 
completed studies address how a strategy map affects strategy revision judgments by altering 
how managers consider information that is used to revise the firm’s strategy. In contrast, my 
proposed study, once completed, would provide evidence of whether a strategy map’s effect on 
workers’ effort allocations is persistent over time, which evidence could lead managers to 
consider using or not using a strategy map to communicate the firm’s strategy. Changing how the 
firm’s strategy is communicated amounts to a revision of the format of the firm’s strategy. Thus, 
any results from my proposed study, once completed, would be like the article summaries that 
managers in my second study judge for relevance to revising the firm’s strategy. 
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2.0  BACKGROUND 
2.1 OBSTACLES TO STRATEGY REVISION 
Given that firms exist to serve their owners, managers entrusted with decision rights within firms 
are expected to create a plan of action that they expect to accomplish the owners’ desires. A plan 
of action that is designed to accomplish long-term fundamental goals is called a strategy (Kaplan 
and Norton 2001a; 2001b). Most owners, as rational economic decision makers, invest in a firm 
with the object of increasing their long-term wealth. This motivation is assumed throughout this 
chapter. However, not all firms can maximize owner wealth using exactly the same strategy. 
Instead, the optimal strategy will vary from firm to firm based on contextual factors, such as 
market share, product position, cost function, supply chain, customer base, human capital, etc. 
(see Porter 1996). For example, Walmart’s strategy is to use its superior supply chain and 
bargaining power to sell goods at the lowest price feasible. Apple, in contrast, does not shy away 
from high prices for its products. Instead, Apple’s strategy is to ensure that its products are 
perceived as being different from competitors’ and therefore worth a premium price. Managers’ 
must discern the optimal strategy for the firm given its unique contextual factors, otherwise 
known as its business environment. 
Once a strategy has been developed, managers then must revise the strategy as new 
information comes to light, continuously optimizing the firm’s strategy to be the best possible 
plan of action for maximizing shareholder wealth, given the information available to managers. 
New information could reflect a change in the underlying environment or it could be the 
revelation of a previously unknown but longstanding aspect of the environment. Either way, 
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managers can successfully revise the firm’s strategy only if they become aware of this new 
information and can understand its implications, updating their prior assumptions about how the 
firm should best navigate its environment. Beer et al. (2005) emphasize the importance of 
attending to information from a changing environment (see also Day and Schoemaker 2005). 
The environment is abundant with changes: changing customer demands and preferences, 
technological advances, global competitors, innovative strategies. This leads us to 
consider that organizations modify and adapt (and thus evolve) their designs in response 
to environmental and organizational changes. In a rapidly changing environment, such as 
that faced by contemporary organizations, organizational fitness – the capacity to learn 
and adapt – becomes especially important. This entails fusing existing organizational 
capabilities with new capabilities to fit new circumstances (Beer et al. 2005, 447). 
My dissertation focuses on two obstacles to optimal strategy revision that managers face. 
The first obstacle to optimal strategy revision is that important information might not come to 
managers’ attention because those responsible for passing information upward through the firm 
often have an interest in the outcome (see Dutton et al. 1997; Prendergast 1993). For example, 
Park et al. (2011) find evidence of middle managers’ tendency to withhold bad news from 
CEOs—that is, news that contradicts the firm’s strategy. This leads CEOs to persist in 
suboptimal strategies. Park et al. emphasize the detrimental effect this has on CEOs themselves, 
who later must answer to shareholders for poorly performing strategies. In contrast, I focus on 
the detrimental effect this has on the firm’s strategy and on firm performance, providing direct 
experimental evidence of this phenomenon and its causes.  
The first obstacle is best described in hierarchical terms: the obstacle of middle managers 
withholding information from upper management when they believe this information contradicts 
the firm’s strategy. The second obstacle is not a hierarchical issue, but rather can be present at 
any level of the firm where the relevance of new information and the appropriateness of the 
firm’s strategy must be judged. This obstacle arises because managers have finite cognitive 
resources for evaluating a seemingly endless stream of new information. Therefore, managers 
 8 
must quickly decide the relevance of new information as it comes to them so as not to waste time 
and cognitive resources on irrelevant information and then must quickly determine what relevant 
information indicates about the firm’s strategy. Managers’ cognitive limitations can sometimes 
cause them not to recognize the relevance of new information or to misinterpret whether the new 
information suggests the firm’s strategy is appropriate or inappropriate (see Campbell et al. 
2015). Thus, the second obstacle is that managers’ cognitive limitations inevitably lead to noisy 
judgments about new information’s relevance and about the strategy’s appropriateness. 
2.2 STRATEGY MAPS AND STRATEGY REVISION 
A strategy map is a format for presenting the firm’s strategy that could help firms overcome the 
two obstacles to proper strategy revision detailed in Section 2.1. Strategy maps cannot be fully 
understood without considering their place within the balanced scorecard framework. More than 
two decades ago, Robert Kaplan and David Norton published their first book on the balanced 
scorecard, a framework for developing both strategic goals and accompanying performance 
measures that indicate progress toward those goals (Kaplan and Norton 1996). The key 
innovation of the balanced scorecard was to require these goals and performance measures to be 
spread across four categories: financial, customer, internal processes, and learning and growth. 
Three of these categories are non-financial, and Kaplan and Norton suggest that success in these 
categories precedes financial success. By balancing a firm’s strategy across four categories that 
include both lagging financial performance and leading non-financial performance, Kaplan and 
Norton sought to encourage managers to balance their effort across short-term and long-term 
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outcomes, rather than solely focusing their energy on short-term financial outcomes to earn 
immediate performance bonuses. 
Within five years, Kaplan and Norton (2001a; 2001b) added strategy maps to this 
framework. A strategy map is a visual representation of the suggested leading-lagging nature of 
strategic goals within the balance scorecard’s four categories. A strategy map links goals from 
different categories together, with arrows to communicate that accomplishing one goal causes 
accomplishment of the next, i.e. causal linkages. Typically, learning and growth goals lead to 
internal processes goals, internal processes goals lead to customer goals, and customer goals lead 
to financial goals. 
Accounting researchers have found strategy maps to have several judgment and decision 
making effects, some positive and some negative. Banker et al. (2004) find that managers’ 
performance evaluations weight more heavily performance measures that are connected to the 
chain of goals on a strategy map over those that are freestanding apart from a strategy map (see 
also Banker et al. 2011). Choi et al. (2013, 2012) suggest that decision makers can treat 
performance measures as surrogates for the strategy itself (which a strategy map attempts to 
embody), potentially leading to suboptimal decisions. Relatedly, Mastilak et al. (2012) report 
that receiving a strategy map leads managers to evaluate worker’s performance without regard to 
their own beliefs about outcome controllability, instead deferring to the outcome controllability 
suggested by the strategy map. Webb (2004) finds that, depending on the perceived strength of 
the cause-and-effect relationships between causally-linked goals, strategy maps can increase goal 
commitment.2 Similarly, Farrell et al. (2012) present evidence that receiving information about 
                                                 
2 Webb (2004) uses the more general term strategic performance measurement system, which is a term that includes 
balanced scorecards with strategy maps. 
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the cause-and-effect relationships between goals—like what is done in a strategy map—helps 
workers allocate effort more optimally between short-term and long-term activities.  
Kaplan and Norton (2008) suggest that strategy maps also affect managers’ judgments 
that relate to the two obstacles to proper strategy revision that I discuss in Section 2.1. Academic 
research related to this suggestion has been limited and mixed. On the organizational level, 
Gimbert et al. (2010) suggest that strategy reformulation improves when firms establish cause-
and-effect relationships between strategic goals, which is a characteristic of a strategy map. This 
improvement could be due to strategy maps helping firms overcome obstacles to proper strategy 
revision, although there is no direct evidence of this presented by Gimbert et al. Likewise, 
Decoene and Bruggeman (2006) conduct a case study and find that balanced scorecards 
(including strategy maps) help align middle managers’ motivations to that of upper management, 
potentially alleviating the obstacle of middle managers withholding information from upper 
management. However, this study might not generalize beyond the firm in question. In contrast, 
Bisbe and Malagueño (2012) find that Gimbert et al.’s findings are limited to firms 
implementing a strategy map in environments with low levels of change. This is not the result 
that would be expected if receiving a strategy map helps managers overcome obstacles to 
strategy revision, because these obstacles should become more and more pronounced in high-
change environments. 
On an individual level, there are two prior studies that suggest a strategy map can help 
overcome the identified obstacles to proper strategy revision. Accordingly, in this dissertation I 
conduct two new studies to answer key questions left unanswered by these prior studies. First, 
Taylor (2010) presents evidence that receiving a strategy map helps managers overcome his or 
her cognitive biases. This result indirectly suggests that receiving a strategy map would help 
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middle managers share important information with upper management, helping firms overcome 
the first obstacle I describe in Section 2.1. However, it is also clear that Tayler does not directly 
test this, and such interpretations are not fully supported by his results. The biases tested in his 
experiment are distinct from those I expect middle managers to face. Also, he only finds a 
strategy map to help overcome managers’ biases when it is accompanied by a mechanism that 
allows managers to choose their own performance measures. As such, Study 1 (beginning in 
Section 3.0) effectively extends Tayler’s results by testing whether a strategy map can overcome 
a different set of manager biases and whether this effect obtains when managers do not choose 
their own performance measures. 
Second, Cheng and Humphreys (2012) provide direct evidence that receiving a strategy 
map helps managers recognize the relevance of new information and the appropriateness of the 
firm’s strategy in light of that new information. This provides direct evidence that receiving a 
strategy map helps overcome the second obstacle identified in Section 2.1. However, this result 
might not apply when the causal linkages of a strategy map are weak—something Cheng and 
Humphreys do not test (see also Luft 2004; Webb 2004). To determine if Cheng and 







3.0  STUDY 1: THE EFFECT OF A STRATEGY MAP ON DECISIONS TO SHARE 
KNOWLEDGE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A strategy map is a popular format for presenting the firm’s strategy. When using a strategy map, 
upper management explicitly and visually asserts causal linkages between the firm’s strategic 
goals by drawing arrows between these goals. Kaplan and Norton (2008; 2001a; 2001b) explain 
that strategy maps’ explicit causal linkages help managers revise the firm’s strategy when such 
revisions are necessary. They suggest that this improvement arises for two main reasons. First, 
they expect strategy maps to improve upper management’s awareness of when a strategy 
revision is necessary (Kaplan and Norton 2008; 2001a; see also Campbell et al. 2015). Second, 
they explain that subordinates are more aware of ground-level circumstances that necessitate 
strategy revisions than their supervisors, and they suggest that strategy maps improve these 
employees’ ability to recognize and communicate these ground-level circumstances to upper 
management. (Kaplan and Norton 2008; 2001a).  
Recent research provides evidence supporting the first point. Campbell et al. (2015) 
explain how Store 24 executives could have recognized their strategy was failing about one year 
earlier than they did if they had conducted strategy map-related statistical analysis. Tayler (2010) 
finds that strategy maps direct managers’ attention to focus on the outcomes and timing to be 
expected if the strategy is successful. Tayler shows that this helps mitigate motivated reasoning 
that otherwise biases managers’ decision making. Cheng and Humphreys (2012) find that a 
strategy map’s causal linkages alter how managers later recall the firm’s strategy such that 
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managers make better judgments about the relevance and strategic implications of new external 
information when they receive a strategy map. 
However, this prior research does not examine Kaplan and Norton’s second point that 
strategy maps positively affect how subordinates communicate about revising the firm’s strategy. 
These communications involve specific knowledge, a term used by Jensen and Meckling (1992) 
to describe knowledge about the firm’s ground-level realities that is held by subordinates and is 
both hard to aggregate and costly to communicate. Specific knowledge is typically conveyed to 
upper management by middle managers. My study examines the extent to which middle 
managers share different types of specific knowledge with upper management and examines 
whether receiving a strategy map positively affects this knowledge sharing. My first research 
question asks whether middle managers share specific knowledge differently based on whether 
the specific knowledge disconfirms the firm’s strategy or confirms the firm’s strategy. I hereafter 
refer to these two types of specific knowledge as disconfirming specific knowledge and 
confirming specific knowledge, respectively. Middle managers are often compensated using 
subjective performance measures. Prior research suggests that such measures would lead middle 
managers to share disconfirming specific knowledge less than they share confirming specific 
knowledge because disconfirming specific knowledge contradicts upper management (e.g. Park 
et al. 2011; Prendergast 1993). My second research question then asks whether receiving a 
strategy map improves middle managers’ knowledge sharing, specifically their willingness to 
share disconfirming specific knowledge to upper management. I summarize these research 
questions as follows. 
1) Do middle managers share objectively useful disconfirming specific knowledge less 
than they share objectively useful confirming specific knowledge? 
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2) Does receiving a strategy map improve how middle managers share disconfirming 
specific knowledge? 
To answer these research questions, I conduct an experiment in which participants act as 
middle managers who, according to the scenario provided, receive objectively useful specific 
knowledge from a subordinate. Participants first indicate how likely they are to pass along this 
specific knowledge to upper management, and then they indicate how receiving this specific 
knowledge affects their overall performance evaluation of the subordinate who provided it. I 
manipulate whether the specific knowledge is disconfirming or confirming. I also manipulate 
whether the firm’s strategy is presented as a strategy map or as a list of the firm’s strategic goals 
without causal linkages between them. I hereafter refer to a list of goals without causal linkages 
as a non-causal list and treat it as the baseline condition for how upper management presents the 
firm’s strategy. 
My study has four major findings, two concerning my first research question and two 
concerning my second research question. First, I find that middle managers indicate that they are 
less likely to pass along disconfirming specific knowledge than confirming specific knowledge. I 
find evidence that this is because middle managers believe that upper management will have a 
worse impression of them if they pass along disconfirming specific knowledge. This belief also 
motivates middle managers to discount the credibility and relevance of disconfirming specific 
knowledge. Second, I find that middle managers give less positive performance evaluations to 
subordinates who communicate disconfirming specific knowledge than to subordinates who 
communicate confirming specific knowledge. Like my first finding, I find that this effect is also 
driven by the impression middle managers believe upper management will have of them and by 
middle managers’ beliefs about the credibility and relevance of the specific knowledge.  
 15 
Third, among middle managers with at least two years of management experience, I find 
that receiving a strategy map has a positive effect on the likelihood that they will pass along 
disconfirming specific knowledge. I find evidence that this is because those who receive a 
strategy map expect that sharing disconfirming specific knowledge will impress upper 
management more than those who do not receive a strategy map. Fourth, I do not find that 
receiving a strategy map mitigates middle managers’ biased performance evaluations of 
subordinates who provide them with disconfirming specific knowledge. 
My results have significant implications for practice in today’s fast-paced and highly-
competitive economy. For a firm to be successful, upper management must create a strategy that 
fits well with the firm’s business environment and must be able to change that strategy as 
environmental conditions change. Disconfirming specific knowledge can be more useful to 
revising the firm’s strategy than confirming specific knowledge because upper management 
already believes the content communicated by confirming specific knowledge. My findings show 
that, given subjective performance measures, middle managers are more likely to pass along 
confirming specific knowledge than disconfirming specific knowledge, thus biasing the type of 
specific knowledge upper management is likely to hear. Also, because middle managers give 
more positive performance evaluations to subordinates who communicate confirming specific 
knowledge, subordinates are likely to skew the type of specific knowledge they provide to 
middle managers toward confirming specific knowledge. Over time, this bias in the type of 
specific knowledge middle managers prefer to receive and pass along could dramatically and 
negatively affect upper management’s ability to make crucial adjustments to the firm’s strategy. 
Although some components of these findings are in line with prior analytical and empirical 
research, I am unaware of any prior research that provides behavioral evidence of this double 
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effect of middle managers’ bias against disconfirming specific knowledge. Specifically, prior 
research that examines agents’ willingness to report disconfirming specific knowledge does not 
examine agents’ biased evaluations of their subordinates who provide them with disconfirming 
specific knowledge (e.g. Park et al. 2011). Thus, my study is useful to practitioners because it 
provides a more complete understanding of the problem than prior research. 
Furthermore, my finding that a strategy map can mitigate one downside of subjective 
performance measures contributes both to practice and to the subjective performance 
measurement literature. This finding contributes to practice by supporting Kaplan and Norton’s 
point that receiving a strategy map can improve the communication of specific knowledge to 
upper management. In a certain way, I provide empirical evidence that helps explain the 
popularity of balanced scorecards (and their accompanying strategy maps). My study suggests 
that practitioners may want to use a strategy map in combination with subjective performance 
measures to reduce some of the downsides of subjective performance measures. My study also 
demonstrates how research on subjective performance measures can be expanded by considering 
how upper management’s framing of the firm’s strategic goals affects middle managers’ 
behavior in response to such performance measures.  
I note that my findings do not suggest a strategy map overcomes all the obstacles 
impeding disconfirming specific knowledge. That is, I do not find support for the notion that 
receiving a strategy map alleviates middle managers’ bias in their performance evaluations of 
subordinates, suggesting that firms that use a strategy map are just as likely to experience that 
obstacle over time as firms that do not use a strategy map. Also, I only find that a strategy map 
benefits middle managers’ knowledge sharing when those middle managers have achieved a 
minimum level of experience. I interpret the experience requirement as evidence that a strategy 
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map affects hypothesis testing norms that usually require a minimum threshold of time to 
internalize. However, the minimum level of management experience suggested in my results, i.e. 
two years of management experience, is hardly an unrealistic expectation for most middle 
managers in today’s firms. 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
3.2.1 Knowledge Sharing and Subjective Performance Measures  
One line of knowledge sharing research focuses on the behavioral effects of mandatory 
knowledge sharing among agents (e.g. Hannan et al. 2013; Towry 2003). For example, Towry 
(2003) considers a mutual monitoring system in which knowledge of one’s effort level is shared 
with a peer agent. She examines how much effort this monitoring system elicits from the 
monitored agent when the peer agent must then report this information to a supervisor rather than 
speaking directly to the worker in question. She finds that the effectiveness of this policy 
depends on how well the team has forged a team identity. Similarly, Hannan et al. (2013) 
examine a mutual monitoring policy in which teammates are required to share knowledge. In this 
case, the authors find that sharing this knowledge amplifies workers’ pre-existing tendencies 
toward using this information to compete or collude. Haesebrouck et al. (2015) examine how 
knowledge sharing affects voluntary helping behaviors when these helping behaviors 
mandatorily include knowledge sharing as well. Furthermore, the expansive literature on the 
effect of relative performance information on effort overlaps considerably with examinations of 
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the effect of mandatory knowledge sharing (e.g. Tafkov 2012; Hannan et al. 2008; Kerr et al. 
2007).  
However, these studies lack significant examination of how agents voluntarily share 
knowledge. A separate strand of knowledge sharing research examines how incentives can 
motivate voluntary knowledge sharing. I rely on this latter strand of research to establish the 
theoretical background for my study. Typically, these studies begin with the assumption that an 
agent possesses private knowledge, and then the studies examine how to optimally motivate this 
agent to share his or her private knowledge for the benefit of the firm (e.g. Hwang et al. 2009; 
Raith 2008; see also Baiman and Demski 1980). An interesting element of these studies is how 
motivation to invest high levels of effort interacts with motivation to report private knowledge 
truthfully. 
Hwang et al. (2009) demonstrate that when agents have more private knowledge or when 
the sharing of their knowledge is more valuable to the firm, the firm relies more on output-based 
performance measures and less on input-based performance measures (see also Raith 2008). 
Output-based performance measures compensate agents based on firm output rather than how 
much work, i.e. input, the agent puts into achieving that output. This type of performance 
measure motivates agents to share their private knowledge because doing so is likely to help firm 
output, thus assisting agents in achieving their output-based goals. This reasoning is in line with 
the revelation principle, which holds that in any private knowledge situation there exists a 
contract that induces truthful reporting of this private knowledge (see Myerson 1982; 1979; 
Gibbard 1973). Output-based performance measures are often part of that revelatory, truth-
inducing contract. 
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Although output-based performance measures can induce truthful reporting, they can lead 
risk-averse agents to invest low levels of effort. The output of the firm is influenced by things 
outside the agent’s control. For risk-averse agents, lack of control over output makes output-
based performance measures less attractive because the agent might invest high levels of effort 
but nonetheless achieve low output. This intuition is confirmed by Hwang et al. (2009), who find 
that when firm output is noisier, firms rely less on output-based performance measures. One way 
firms optimize agents’ effort with output-based performance measures is by combining them 
with subjective performance measures. Subjective performance measures can be advantageous to 
induce high levels of effort from risk-averse agents because supervisors can adjust for 
uncontrollable events that lead to poor output (see Bol 2008; Gibbs et al. 2004). Thus, subjective 
performance measures can reduce agents’ risk of investing high levels of effort but nonetheless 
achieving low output. 
However, subjective performance measures can negatively affect their knowledge 
sharing, the opposite effect as output-based performance measures: positively affecting effort but 
negatively affecting truthful reporting. Prendergast (1993) develops a model demonstrating how 
subjective performance measures can negatively affect truthful reporting. His model shows that 
subjective performance evaluation can lead agents to be less truthful in their reports, because 
they tend to report what the supervisors want to hear to curry favor on subjective performance 
measures.3 Prendergast demonstrates the necessary tradeoff between incentives to motivate high 
levels of effort, i.e. subjective performance evaluations, and incentives that motivate truthful 
reporting, i.e. objective performance evaluations such as output-based measures. My study is like 
                                                 
3 An extensive “yes men” literature has developed additional models and gathered empirical evidence that refine and 
build upon Prendergast’s study (for example, see Gneezy et al. 2017; Garciano and Posner 2005; Bentley MacLeod 
2003; Khatri and Tsang 2003; Ewerhart and Schmitz 2000; Avery et al. 1999). 
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this model in that I assume a firm uses subjective performance measures for middle managers, in 
addition to any objective performance measures. I therefore expect these subjective performance 
measures to lead middle managers to be biased against reporting knowledge that contradicts the 
firm’s strategy. As explained in Section 3.3.3, I expect that a strategy map is one way firms 
reduce subjective performance measures’ detrimental effect on truthful reporting without 
sacrificing their positive effect on effort motivation. 
3.2.2 Specific Knowledge and Strategy Revision 
A firm’s strategy is a set of goals that upper management believes will move the firm 
from its current state to a more desired state, which is typically a state of increased long-term 
shareholder wealth (Kaplan and Norton 2008, 2001a). However, upper management may not 
possess the knowledge necessary to craft the optimal strategy. Jensen and Meckling (1992) argue 
that knowledge of the firm’s ground-level realities is asymmetrically distributed within the firm 
such that those with higher hierarchical rank have less of this knowledge. This knowledge of 
ground-level conditions is referred to by Jensen and Meckling as specific knowledge. Senior 
managers in the firm cannot possess as much specific knowledge as the collective knowledge of 
employees working at the ground level of the firm due to cognitive limitations (see also Hwang 
et al. 2009; Raith 2008; Beer et al. 2005; Brews and Hunt 1999; Dutton et al. 1997).4 Given the 
                                                 
4 Dutton et al. (1997) summarize these cognitive limitations as follows. “While organizational environments are 
becoming increasingly complex, dynamic and interdependent…the information-processing capacity of the top 
management group remains stable and is inadequate for detecting, interpreting and handling these environmental 
challenges…. It is often middle managers rather than the top managers who have their hands on the ‘pulse of the 
organization’ and are closer to customers and other stakeholders” (Dutton et al. 1997, 407). 
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limitations of upper management’s knowledge of the firm’s ground-level realities, the firm’s 
strategy may be sub-optimal, i.e. it may not be a good fit for its environment. 
An example of specific knowledge used by Jensen and Meckling (1999) is the 
understanding a machine operator has of the machine he or she works with. This specific 
knowledge is not easily aggregated, and it is costly for the operator to transfer this knowledge to 
supervisors, i.e. it is specific knowledge. If upper management issues a firm strategy that is built 
on the assumption that the firm can improve throughput by hiring more skilled machine 
operators, specific knowledge about the machine’s operation could suggest a revision to upper 
management’s strategy. For example, if the machine operator knew from experience that the 
constraint on the machine’s throughput was not operator skill level but rather the accessibility of 
replacement parts, then the machine operator’s specific knowledge could help upper 
management revise the firm’s strategy.5 
My research questions are based on the premise that upper management relies on middle 
managers as conduits for the flow of specific knowledge to upper management (see Dutton et al. 
2001; 1997; Mintzberg and Waters 1985). I expect that middle managers “have their hands on 
the ‘pulse of the organization’” (Dutton et al. 1997, 407) because they are recipients of specific 
knowledge from subordinates who are directly involved in the ground-level realities of the firm. 
This premise is in line with numerous prior studies, some of which are in the management 
literature, cited above, and some of which are in the auditing literature. Kadous et al. (2017) 
summarize this literature on auditor knowledge sharing by arguing that lower-level auditors are 
                                                 
5 Per Kaplan and Norton (2008, 254), “many ideas for new strategic options can arise from employees closest to 
customers and processes.” For example, employees’ specific knowledge is argued to have “triggered Intel’s switch 
from memory chips to microprocessors, Honda’s shift in emphasis from motorcycles to automobiles, and 3M 
Corporation’s marketing of Post-it notes” (Kaplan and Norton 2008, 275). 
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those at the front lines of the audit, gathering most of the evidence, and if they do not voluntarily 
report issues to their supervisors, those supervisors are unlikely to find the issues by themselves 
(see, as cited by Kadous et al. 2017, Bennett and Hatfield 2013; Vera-Muñoz et al. 2006; Rich et 
al. 1997). 
3.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.3.1 Impression Management and Disconfirmation Bias 
Given upper management’s cognitive limitations, middle managers should not 
automatically pass along all specific knowledge to upper management. Rather, middle managers 
must judge the likely usefulness of specific knowledge to upper management and only pass along 
specific knowledge that is likely to be useful. As stated above, specific knowledge tends to 
include qualitative elements that make it costly to aggregate. My study focuses on the likelihood 
that middle managers will pass along subordinates’ specific knowledge to upper management. I 
describe this as reporting likelihood or the likelihood that middle managers, once they receive 
useful specific knowledge, will pass it along to upper management. (Reporting likelihood is one 
of the main dependent variables in my study.)  
As argued above, subjective performance measures can lead middle managers to be less 
truthful in their reporting, favoring reports that are likely to impress upper management over 
reports that are unlikely to impress upper management (Prendergast 1993). This prediction can 
be understood as an effect of two psychological influences: (1) impression management, which 
leads to (2) disconfirmation bias. Impression management is one person’s effort to affect others’ 
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impression of him or her (Bozeman and Kacmar 1997). Upper management can influence future 
raises and promotions for middle managers, especially through subjective performance 
evaluations (Bol 2008). This influence could lead middle managers to engage in impression 
management to secure good subjective performance measures. Middle managers consider 
whether passing along different types of specific knowledge will impress upper management 
(Bozeman and Kacmar 1997; see also Jones 1964).  
If a middle manager passes along specific knowledge suggesting that the firm’s strategy 
is not appropriate for its environment, i.e. disconfirming specific knowledge, upper management 
could interpret this as an indication that middle managers are not doing enough to implement the 
firm’s strategy. That is, disconfirming specific knowledge could be interpreted by upper 
management as an indication that middle managers are investing a low level of effort.6 In 
contrast, upper management is unlikely to interpret confirming specific knowledge as an 
indication that middle managers are investing a low level of effort. Thus, impression 
management theory leads to the prediction that middle managers are likely to prefer passing 
along confirming specific knowledge more than disconfirming specific knowledge. 
Disconfirmation bias is a cognitive bias characterized by individuals scrutinizing 
evidence that disconfirms their preferred outcome more than they scrutinize evidence that 
confirms their preferred outcome, because this additional scrutiny helps conjure up reasons for 
rejecting disconfirming evidence (Edwards and Smith 1996; Lord et al. 1979; see also Taber and 
                                                 
6 Ittner and Larcker (2003) suggest that managers often do not empirically test the financial outcome effect of non-
financial strategic goals because managers only use non-financial strategic goals they consider to have a “self-
evident” (91) connection to financial outcomes. Huelsbeck et al. (2011) find that when senior managers are 
convinced of the firm’s strategy they are unlikely to change that strategy based on a disconfirming signal (see also 
Campbell et al. 2015). Based on these studies, upper management is likely to be convinced of the firm’s strategy. 
Thus, middle managers likely expect upper management to favor a user error interpretation of disconfirming 
specific knowledge, i.e. interpreting disconfirming knowledge as an indication that middle managers are not 
implementing the firm’s strategy correctly. 
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Lodge 2006; Kunda 1990). As stated above, middle managers likely prefer passing along 
specific knowledge that makes a relatively positive impression on upper management, especially 
by showing that the firm’s strategy is a good fit. Based on disconfirmation bias theory, then, 
middle managers who receive disconfirming specific knowledge are likely to subject that 
knowledge to more scrutiny than those who receive confirming specific knowledge. Thus, 
middle managers who receive disconfirming specific knowledge are likely to conjure up reasons 
that knowledge is irrelevant or not credible, which leads to lower reporting likelihood for 
disconfirming specific knowledge than for confirming specific knowledge.7  
H1: Middle managers are less likely to report disconfirming specific knowledge to upper 
management than confirming specific knowledge. 
This prediction is important because disconfirming specific knowledge can be more 
valuable to upper management than confirming specific knowledge (e.g. see Campbell et al. 
2015; Huelsbeck et al. 2011). Upper management already agrees with the underlying facts 
conveyed by confirming specific knowledge and is already prepared to follow the course of 
action suggested by confirming specific knowledge. In contrast, disconfirming specific 
knowledge runs counter to upper management’s current beliefs about the firm, suggesting a 
course of action that upper management likely, a priori, considers imprudent. It can take 
significant repetition of disconfirming signals for a firm to change course. For example, Store 24 
received poor feedback from customers about its new strategy for two years before upper 
management was convinced the new strategy was failing (Campbell et al. 2015). 
                                                 
7 Because my study examines when middle managers inappropriately withhold specific knowledge, I use specific 
knowledge that is objectively useful to upper management. 
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3.3.2 Middle Managers’ Evaluations of Subordinates 
Specific knowledge flows to middle managers from subordinates who are better informed 
about the ground-level conditions of the firm, and middle managers then decide whether to 
report this specific knowledge to upper management. Middle managers also often give subjective 
performance evaluations for subordinates, affecting subordinates’ future raises and promotions. I 
expect both impression management and disconfirmation bias to influence how middle managers 
evaluate subordinates’ performance (which is hereafter referred to as subordinate evaluation).  
I expect this because middle managers are often compensated using both objective and 
subjective performance measures. While subjective performance measures motivate middle 
managers to withhold disconfirming specific knowledge from upper management, objective 
performance measures still typically motivate middle managers to seek objectively strong 
outcomes. Middle managers could interpret disconfirming specific knowledge as a sign that 
subordinates themselves are not doing enough to make the firm’s strategy work, which would 
reduce middle managers’ chances of achieving objective performance measures. This is the same 
interpretation of disconfirming specific knowledge that middle managers project onto upper 
management. That is, the same disconfirming specific knowledge that middle managers expect to 
give upper management the unfavorable impression that middle managers are investing a low 
level of effort also gives middle managers the unfavorable impression that subordinates are 
investing a low level of effort. As such, I expect middle managers to give less positive 
performance evaluations to subordinates who provide disconfirming specific knowledge than to 
subordinates who provide confirming specific knowledge.  
Furthermore, disconfirmation bias leads middle managers to scrutinize disconfirming 
specific knowledge more than they scrutinize confirming specific knowledge, giving middle 
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managers more opportunity to internally criticize that disconfirming specific knowledge as less 
credible and less relevant. A subordinate who provides less credible and less relevant specific 
knowledge is likely to be viewed less favorably and is likely to receive a less positive 
subordinate evaluation than a subordinate who provides specific knowledge that is viewed as 
more credible and more relevant.  
H2: Middle managers evaluate subordinates who provide disconfirming specific 
knowledge less positively than they evaluate subordinates who provide confirming 
specific knowledge. 
3.3.3 A Strategy Map and Impression Management  
When upper management uses a strategy map, they arrange the firm’s strategic goals in a 
causal sequence, with arrows drawn between goals to indicate how they are believed to drive and 
cause each other. The arrows that adjoin goals in a strategy map can be called causal linkages 
because these arrows suggest a relationship of cause-and-effect between strategic goals. A 
strategy map differs from alternative methods of communicating strategic goals that do not 
define a causal sequence among the goals, i.e. non-causal lists. Causally connecting strategic 
goals is a defining characteristic of strategic performance measurement systems, in general, 
which are defined as systems of performance measurement that attempt to align managers’ 
incentives to the firm’s strategy (Gimbert et al. 2010; see also Webb 2004). Strategy maps, 
together with a balanced scorecard, form a type of strategic performance measurement system 
(Kaplan and Norton 2004; 2001a). I focus on strategy maps because the balanced scorecard is 
one of the most widespread strategic performance measurement systems (Rigby and Bilodeau 
2009). It is possible, although I do not directly examine it, that the results of this study could also 
apply to other types of strategic performance measurement systems. 
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My second research question asks whether receiving a strategy map improves middle 
managers’ judgments about sharing disconfirming specific knowledge. I expect that receiving a 
strategy map does improve those judgments because it alters middle managers’ incentives, 
changing how disconfirming specific knowledge affects impression management. Thus, I expect 
that receiving a strategy map moderates the relationship between the type of specific knowledge, 
i.e. confirming or disconfirming, and impression management.  
This is because a strategy map presents middle managers with a set of hypotheses about 
how a firm’s goals causally interact (see Kaplan and Norton 2001a) and the norm for hypothesis 
testing is that negative results can be commonplace (otherwise the hypothesis would not be 
worth testing). By explicitly stating these hypothesized relationships, upper management 
implicitly invites members of the firm to test these hypotheses. Indeed, this is one of the original 
purposes of strategy maps, per Kaplan and Norton. “The key, then, to implementing strategy is 
[…] to test the hypotheses continually, and to use those results to adapt as required” (Kaplan and 
Norton 2001a, 176). Receiving a strategy map allows for an alternative reason for middle 
managers to pass along disconfirming specific knowledge apart from the middle manager 
investing a low level of effort. Instead, in the context of a strategy map, a high level of effort 
includes, or even requires, hypothesis testing and thus the reporting of negative results when they 
occur. This leads to the prediction, captured in my third hypothesis, that receiving a strategy map 
increases reporting likelihood for middle managers who receive disconfirming specific 
knowledge. 
H3: When middle managers receive a strategy map, they have higher reporting likelihood 
for disconfirming specific knowledge to upper management than when they do not 
receive a strategy map.  
Using the same logic, I expect that receiving a strategy map mitigates at least part of H2, 
which predicts bias in middle managers’ performance evaluations of subordinates who provide 
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them with disconfirming specific knowledge. I argue that H2 is due to middle managers 
interpreting disconfirming specific knowledge as a sign that subordinates are not doing enough 
to make the firm’s strategy work. If receiving a strategy map alleviates middle managers’ 
concerns about passing along disconfirming specific knowledge due to the norms of hypothesis 
testing, then middle managers who receive a strategy map could also be less concerned about 
subordinates participating in hypothesis testing.  
H4: When middle managers receive a strategy map, they give higher evaluations to 
subordinates who provide disconfirming specific knowledge than when middle 
managers do not receive a strategy map.  
3.4 METHOD 
3.4.1 Experimental Design 
I use an experiment to test H1 through H4. I manipulate two between-subject factors, 
each with two levels, resulting in a 2 × 2 design. The two between-subject factors are the 
presence of a strategy map and specific knowledge type. To manipulate the presence of a 
strategy map, I provide participants with either a strategy map or a non-causal list made up of the 
same strategic goals. The difference between the two levels of this factor is the presence or 
absence of the causal linkages used in a strategy map to indicate causal linkages between 
strategic goals. I manipulate specific knowledge by providing participants with either confirming 
specific knowledge or disconfirming specific knowledge. The confirming specific knowledge 
supports the firm’s strategic goals and the disconfirming specific knowledge contradicts the 




My participants are Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, who provide their responses 
online and are paid a flat fee of $1.50 for participation. Mechanical Turk workers have been 
shown to be effective proxies for employees in prior studies (see Farrell et al. 2017; also see 
Mason and Suri 2012 for a review). I follow Farrell et al.’s pre-screening procedure to make it 
more likely that participants’ responses are meaningful. Specifically, at the time they participate 
in my study, all workers have a “master” qualification, more than 1,000 successfully completed 
tasks, and an approval rating of 95% or above for their work. I also only allow workers to 
participate if Amazon has verified they are United States residents. My initial sample includes 
340 complete participant responses. I further screen this sample by excluding twelve responses 
that were from an IP address that was unacceptable (I exclude one IP address that is from outside 
of the United States, one IP address that is from the city where I was based at the time, and ten IP 
addresses that are duplicated among multiple participants).8 Thus, my final sample consists of 
responses from 328 participants.  
3.4.3 Experimental Task and Procedures 
The experiment consists of six stages, is computer-based, and participants advance from 
screen to screen with no opportunity to return to prior screens. In stage one, participants learn of 
                                                 
8 I exclude responses from IP addresses outside of the United States because I cannot independently confirm 
Amazon’s verification procedures. I am aware of reports that some workers from outside the United States have 
circumvented those procedures in the past. I exclude IP addresses from the city where I was based at the time as an 
extra experimental control to exclude responses that may be from individuals at my institution or otherwise 
connected to me who might have known the study was being conducted and knew of its experimental design. 
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their role as a newly-hired regional manager at First Palisade Bank, a fictional retail bank in the 
United States. Participants learn that, as regional manager, they oversee three bank branches and 
report to the CEO. They also learn that First Palisade Bank employs two types of customer 
service representative: tellers (who perform banking services at the counter) and loan officers 
(who assist customers with purchasing and maintaining loan products at desks apart from the 
counter). The scenario indicates that upper management determines regional managers’ future 
raises and promotions because I believe this is salient to middle managers in practice (Park et al. 
2011). 
Figure 1: Study 1 Presence of a Strategy Map Manipulation 
Strategy Map Condition 
 




In stage two, participants read an email from the CEO describing the CEO’s new strategy 
for First Palisade Bank. I manipulate whether this new strategy is a strategy map or a non-causal 
list of the same strategic goals (see Figure 1).9 I maintain the order of the goals across 
conditions, while simply omitting, from the non-causal list condition, arrows that cue strategy 
map-like causal linkages.  
In stage three, participants complete a distractor task to clear their working memory, 
because my research questions are most relevant to situations where middle managers retrieve 
the firm’s strategy from long-term memory (see Cheng and Humphreys 2012). In the distractor 
task, participants have one minute to count the number of times the letter “c” appears in a short 
passage.10 To maintain proper control over this distractor task, participants are not able to 
advance from this screen before one minute has passed and after a minute they are automatically 
advanced to the next screen where they input their count of how many times the letter “c” was 
used.  
Figure 2: Study 1 Specific Knowledge Type Manipulation 
Disconfirming Specific Knowledge Condition 
 
Confirming Specific Knowledge Condition 
 
 
                                                 
9 As in the experiment by Cheng and Humphreys (2012), I have participants assume the role of a newly hired 
manager and provide them with a new strategy from the CEO. This helps avoid concerns that participants would 
assume prior beliefs, which could create confounding motivated reasoning-related behavior (see Tayler 2010). 
10 I use a passage of a public domain, English text acquired through Project Gutenberg: www.gutenberg.org. 
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In stage four, participants receive feedback from one of their subordinate branch 
managers. This feedback consists of either confirming or disconfirming specific knowledge, as 
shown in Figure 2. On the next screen is stage five, where participants use a scale of -3 (very 
unlikely) to +3 (very likely) to indicate the likelihood that they would report the specific 
knowledge presented in stage four to the CEO. Participant responses on this screen provide my 
main dependent measure of reporting likelihood. 
In stage six, participants respond to various post-experiment questions. They respond to 
recognition questions that test how easily they can access the firm’s strategic goals from long-
term memory. They also answer questions to test whether they made the causal inferences I 
expect them to make when they are given a strategy map. Participants then indicate how they 
perceive reporting the branch managers’ specific knowledge to the CEO would affect the CEO’s 
impression of them. They also indicate, in separate questions, how credible and relevant they 
perceive the branch manager’s specific knowledge to be. They answer a question on how the 
specific knowledge they received from the branch manager affects how they would evaluate the 
performance of that branch manager. Lastly, they answer manipulation check questions and 
provide demographics. 
3.4.4 Measures and Constructs 
Specific knowledge type is an indicator variable I use to distinguish between participants 
given disconfirming specific knowledge (coded as one) and participants given confirming 
specific knowledge (coded as zero). I use the indicator variable strategy map, which is coded as 
one when participants receive the firm’s strategy in the form of a strategy map and coded as zero 
when participants receive the firm’s strategy in the form of a non-causal list of the same strategic 
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goals. Reporting likelihood is the dependent measure for which participants indicate the 
likelihood that they would report the specific knowledge they received to upper management, 
measured on a 7-point scale from -3 (very unlikely) to +3 (very likely). Subordinate evaluation is 
also a dependent measure, drawn from participants’ responses to the question, “Does the branch 
manager's feedback lead you to have a more positive or more negative evaluation of the branch 
manager's overall performance?” This variable is measured on a 7-point scale from -3 (much 
more negative) to +3 (much more positive). 
CEO impression is made up of participants’ responses to the question, “Do you believe 
reporting the branch manager’s feedback to the CEO leads the CEO to have a more positive or 
more negative impression of you?” It is measured on a 7-point scale from -3 (much more 
negative impression of you) to +3 (much more positive impression of you). I ask two questions 
that I use to create a latent variable, subjective usefulness. I describe the factor analysis used to 
create this latent variable below in Section 3.5.1. The two questions I ask are called perceived 
credibility and perceived relevance.11  Perceived credibility is a participant’s response to the 
question, “How credible do you find the branch manager’s feedback?” measured on a 7-point 
scale, from -3 (not at all credible) to +3 (very credible). Perceived relevance is a participant’s 
response to the question, “How relevant do you believe the branch manager’s feedback is to 
evaluating the CEO’s new strategy?” measured on a 7-point scale from -3 (very irrelevant) to +3 
(very relevant).  
                                                 
11 I also asked perceived importance which is a participant’s response to the question, “How important do you find 
the branch manager’s feedback?” measured on a 7-point scale from -3 (very unimportant) to +3 (very important). 
However, because this question is overly broad and less closely connected to the concept of disconfirmation bias, I 
do not consider it as a question measuring disconfirmation bias. Confirming this intuition, if I include perceived 
importance as a predictor of my latent variable measuring disconfirmation bias, the goodness of fit statistics in my 
SEM models in Section 4 are substantially reduced. 
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3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Factor Analysis 
In Table 1, I provide mean and standard deviations for several variables, broken out by 
experimental condition. Panel A shows reporting likelihood, and Panel B shows subordinate 
evaluation. Panel C shows the latent variable subjective usefulness, and Panel D shows CEO 
impression.  
Table 1: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Reporting Likelihood: means (standard deviations) 





n = 78 
2.39  
(0.81) 
n = 83 
2.35  
(0.93) 





n = 82 
1.69  
(1.36) 
n = 85 
1.59 
(1.47) 




n = 160 
2.04  
(1.17) 
n = 168 
1.96  
(1.29) 
n = 328 
 
Panel B: Subordinate Evaluation: means (standard deviations) 





n = 78 
1.92  
(0.98) 
n = 83 
1.86  
(1.00) 





n = 82 
0.75  
(1.50) 
n = 85 
0.82 
(1.42) 




n = 160 
1.33  
(1.39) 
n = 168 
1.33  
(1.34) 







Table 1: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
Panel C: Subjective Usefulness: means (standard deviations) 





n = 78 
0.13  
(0.70) 
n = 83 
0.09  
(0.71) 





n = 82 
0.04  
(0.72) 
n = 85 
-0.09 
(0.84) 




n = 160 
0.08  
(0.71) 
n = 168 
0.00  
(0.78) 
n = 328 
 
Panel D: CEO Impression: means (standard deviations) 





n = 78 
1.82  
(1.09) 
n = 83 
1.74  
(1.12) 





n = 82 
0.46  
(1.37) 
n = 85 
0.35 
(1.38) 




n = 160 
1.13  
(1.41) 
n = 168 
1.03  
(1.44) 
n = 328 
 
Below I examine H1 through H4 using a latent variable, subjective usefulness, to proxy 
for the role of disconfirmation bias in my statistical tests. I name the variable subjective 
usefulness because when a person exhibits disconfirmation bias, he or she is likely to 
subjectively downgrade the perceived usefulness of the evidence that disconfirms his or her 
preferred outcome. I use a latent variable rather than individuals’ raw responses because I want 
to extract the central underlying construct of disconfirmation bias, which is only partly captured 
by each raw response.12 I create this latent variable using load factors derived from factor 
                                                 
12 This decision is also supported empirically. When I use raw responses for disconfirmation bias, either alone or 
together, the model’s goodness of fit statistics are substantially reduced. 
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analysis of my two observed variables related to disconfirmation bias, which I interpret as 
proxies for the overall concept of usefulness: perceived credibility and perceived relevance. Only 
one factor has an eigenvalue close to one (eigenvalue = 0.99). My two observed variables have 
the same load factor: perceived credibility (0.705) and perceived relevance (0.705). Subjective 
usefulness has a mean of 0.00, a median of 0.339, and a standard deviation of 0.784. 
3.5.2 Tests of H1 
For all statistical tests of H1, I only use responses from participants who received a non-
causal list. I do this because I hypothesize in H3 that strategy map affects reporting likelihood, 
and therefore the best assurance of internal validity for my H1 tests is to test H1 using only 
responses from participants who did not receive a strategy map. If I were to test H1 using 
responses from participants in both the strategy map and non-causal list condition, it would be 
difficult to disentangle H1 and H3 effects.  
In H1, I predict middle managers are less likely to report disconfirming specific 
knowledge than confirming specific knowledge. I test this using a two-sample t-test that 
compares the variable reporting likelihood between the two groups indicated by the variable 
specific knowledge type. These two groups reflect participants who received disconfirming 
specific knowledge (specific knowledge type = 1) and confirming specific knowledge (specific 
knowledge type = 0). I find that specific knowledge type has a significant negative effect on 
reporting likelihood (t = 5.58, p < 0.001 one-tailed), meaning that reporting likelihood for 
participants given disconfirming specific knowledge (mean = 1.59) is significantly lower than it 
is for participants given confirming specific knowledge (mean = 2.35). This result is consistent 
with H1, suggesting that middle managers are biased against reporting disconfirming specific 
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knowledge to upper management. Results supporting H1 are important because H1 suggests that 
upper management may not receive the crucial disconfirming information they need in order to 
revise the firm’s strategy. 
In Section 3.3.1, I argue that the effects predicted in H1 are caused by impression 
management and disconfirmation bias, with the former leading to the latter. This argument 
suggests a series of mediating relationships. Accordingly, I use SEM analysis to examine 
whether my measure of impression management mediates the effect of specific knowledge type 
on reporting likelihood and whether subjective usefulness mediates some of the effect of 
impression management on reporting likelihood. SEM analysis uses a set of regression models to 
examine multiple mediation pathways simultaneously. This makes SEM analysis an effective 
statistical test for my H1 predictions about the mediating roles played by impression 
management and then disconfirmation bias. 
Figure 3: Study 1 SEM Model for H1 
 
Goodness of fit statistics: n = 160; χ2 (1) = 0.447 (p = 0.504); CFI = 1.000; RMSEA < 0.001 
 
As for my SEM model (shown in Figure 3, along with results and goodness of fit 
statistics), the model first tests a simple linear regression to show that specific knowledge type 
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has a significant negative effect on CEO impression (p < 0.001 one-tailed).13 Then the model 
shows that CEO impression has a significant positive effect on subjective usefulness (p < 0.001 
one-tailed). This shows that when specific knowledge is perceived to be less impressive to upper 
management, participants tend to view it as less credible and less relevant. Lastly, the model tests 
all three predictors (specific knowledge type, CEO impression, and subjective usefulness) in a 
multiple linear regression predicting reporting likelihood. For comparison, above I report that in 
a univariate t-test, which omits any mediators, specific knowledge type is a significant predictor 
(t = 5.58, p < 0.001 one-tailed) of reporting likelihood. In this final SEM step, however, specific 
knowledge type is non-significant (p = 0.680 two-tailed) as a predictor of reporting likelihood, 
while my mediators (CEO impression and subjective usefulness) are significant predictors of 
reporting likelihood (both with p < 0.001, one-tailed). This suggests that the effect of specific 
knowledge type on reporting likelihood observed in my initial tests of H1 are fully explained by 
my measures of impression management and disconfirmation bias (Baron and Kenny 1986). 
Furthermore, I conduct a Sobel test on the CEO impression mediation path (which mediates 
specific knowledge type and reporting likelihood), without including subjective usefulness for 
simplicity. I find a significant indirect effect (p < 0.001 one-tailed) and a non-significant direct 
effect (p = 0.954 two-tailed). This result further supports an interpretation of complete mediation. 
The SEM model supports my reasoning behind H1. First, the results from the SEM model 
are consistent with impression management affecting disconfirmation bias, and with both 
disconfirmation bias and impression management playing a role in dissuading middle managers 
from reporting disconfirming specific knowledge. Importantly, the SEM model shows that my 
subjective usefulness measure does not explain the entirety of the effect of impression 
                                                 
13 All SEM analysis in this study is completed using Stata/SE, version 14.2. 
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management, because CEO Impression is still a significant predictor of reporting likelihood even 
with subjective usefulness included in the model.  
3.5.3 Tests of H2 
Similar to my tests for H1, all statistical tests of H2 only use responses from participants 
who received a non-causal list. Again, I hypothesize in H4 that strategy map affects subordinate 
evaluation. I can, therefore, more effectively test H2 by excluding responses from participants in 
the strategy map condition. In H2, I predict that middle managers will evaluate subordinates who 
provide disconfirming specific knowledge less positively than subordinates who provide 
confirming specific knowledge. I test this hypothesis using a two-sample t-test that compares the 
variable subordinate evaluation across the two groups indicated by the variable specific 
knowledge type. In a univariate t-test, I find that specific knowledge type has a significant 
negative effect on subordinate evaluation (t = 7.66, p < 0.001 one-tailed), meaning that 
subordinate evaluation for participants given disconfirming specific knowledge (mean = 0.82) is 
significantly lower than it is for participants given confirming specific knowledge (mean = 1.86).  
This result is consistent with H2, suggesting that middle managers are biased against 
subordinates who provide them with disconfirming specific knowledge. Over time, this bias 
could lead subordinates to shift their efforts away from providing middle managers with 
disconfirming specific knowledge and toward providing middle managers with confirming 
specific knowledge (see Kassing 2009; 2002).14 This would exacerbate upper management’s 
                                                 
14 The long-term implications of middle managers’ bias hearken to Machiavelli’s (1532/1988) famous quotation 
from The Prince. “And what physicians say about consumptive diseases is also true […], that at the beginning of the 
illness, it is easy to treat but difficult to diagnose, but […], as time passes it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to 
treat” (11). That is, disconfirming specific knowledge is often an early signal of problems with the firm’s strategy. 
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difficulty in acquiring crucial disconfirming specific knowledge to help revise the firm’s strategy 
because middle managers, who are already more reluctant to pass along disconfirming specific 
knowledge to upper management, would have less disconfirming specific knowledge to consider 
in the first place. 
Figure 4: Study 1 SEM Model for H2 
 
Goodness of fit statistics: n = 160; χ2 (1) = 0.447 (p = 0.504); CFI = 1.000; RMSEA < 0.001 
 
In Section 3.3.2, I argue that the effects predicted in H2 are caused by disconfirmation 
bias and impression management, like H1. I test this reasoning using an SEM model, shown in 
Figure 4 (along with goodness of fit statistics). All but the final regression in this model are 
identical to the results detailed above in my tests of H1. The final regression in the SEM model 
shows a positive significant effect of the mediators CEO impression (p < 0.001 one-tailed) and 
subjective usefulness (p < 0.001 one-tailed) on subordinate evaluation. I find that specific 
knowledge type has a non-significant effect (p = 0.238 two-tailed) on subordinate evaluation.  
                                                 
By the time these problems manifest themselves in the form of poor lagging financial indicators it may be 
considerably more difficult to fix those problems. This is in line with Park et al. (2011) who suggest that biased 
reporting often leads to failed strategies and that shareholders often fire or otherwise penalize CEOs over firms with 
failed strategies. 
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Specific knowledge type has a significant effect on subordinate evaluation in univariate 
tests but has a non-significant effect on subordinate evaluation in the final model, suggesting 
complete mediation (Baron and Kenny 1986). I conduct a Sobel test on the CEO impression 
mediation path (which mediates specific knowledge type and reporting likelihood), again 
omitting the subjective usefulness pathway, and find a significant indirect effect (p < 0.001 one-
tailed) as well as a significant direct effect (p = 0.016 one-tailed). This result contradicts my less 
formal suggestion of complete mediation based on specific knowledge type’s non-significance in 
the final model. Instead, this Sobel test suggests that even though my reasoning for H2 is 
generally supported, there are likely to be additional reasons that middle managers give biased 
subordinate evaluations apart from what is captured by my variables for impression management 
and disconfirmation bias. 
3.5.4 Tests of H3 
In H3, I predict that managers who receive a strategy map will be more likely to report 
disconfirming specific knowledge to upper management than middle managers who receive a 
non-causal list. As a test of this hypothesis, I use two-sample t-tests to directly examine the effect 
of receiving a strategy map on the dependent variable of reporting likelihood, restricting this test 
to those who receive disconfirming specific knowledge. Inconsistent with H3, I do not find a 
significant effect of strategy map on reporting likelihood (p = 0.169 one-tailed).  
However, this may be because the norms associated with a strategy map are not active 
among inexperienced managers. Managers need to be exposed to norms for a sufficient period of 
time in order for those norms to enter into their thought process when making decisions (see 
Korte 2009 for a useful summary of prior research on how social norms are learned over time 
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through socialization). When I repeat this t-test, further restricting the sample to include only 
participants who receive disconfirming specific knowledge and who have management 
experience at or above the median number of years (management experience ≥ 2 years), strategy 
map has a significant, positive effect on reporting likelihood (n = 91, p = 0.010 one-tailed). This 
result supports H3 for this subsample. These results suggest that receiving a strategy map can 
improve middle managers’ judgments about passing along disconfirming specific knowledge, 
with the caveat that this effect appears only when middle managers have sufficient experience to 
internalize the associated norms. 
In Section 3.3.3, I predict that the strategy map effect would be due to an improvement in 
how middle managers think disconfirming specific knowledge would be received. This suggests 
a moderating relationship between receiving a strategy map and the H1 coefficient between 
specific knowledge type and CEO impression. To confirm this reasoning, I conduct multi-group 
path analysis using the SEM model from my tests of H1. I restrict this test to those who have at 
least two years of management experience, because these participants’ responses support H3.15 I 
also relax my restriction on specific knowledge type to include both conditions. The results of 
this analysis, along with goodness of fit statistics, are shown in Figure 5. In this multi-group path 
analysis, I estimate two separate SEM models based on two subsamples: the subsample of 
participants who receive a strategy map and the subsample of participants who receive a non-
causal list. I hold constant between the two SEM estimation models all intercepts and all 
coefficients other than the coefficient of specific knowledge type predicting impression 
management. 
                                                 
15 When I conduct the multi-group path analysis on the full sample of participants (regardless of management 
experience level), the chi-square test comparing the H1 coefficient between the two groups is non-significant (p = 
0.241). This result is in line with my prior non-significant t-test of H3 using the full sample. 
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Figure 5: Study 1 SEM Model for H3 
 
Goodness of fit statistics: n = 186; χ2 (6) = 238.587 (p < 0.001); CFI = 1.000; RMSEA < 0.001 
 
Figure 5 shows that the coefficient of specific knowledge type predicting impression 
management is less negative for those who receive a strategy map (B = -1.02, p < 0.001 one-
tailed) than for those who do not receive a strategy map (B = -1.83, p < 0.001 one-tailed). I 
conduct a chi-squared comparison on these two coefficients and find that they differ at a 
significant level (χ2 = 8.84, p = 0.003). This result supports my reasoning that receiving a 
strategy map changes middle managers’ impression management calculus about disconfirming 
specific knowledge.  
The effect observed in H3 demonstrates one way in which implementing a strategy map 
can be beneficial. My H3 results are also consistent with Kaplan and Norton’s (2008; 2001a; 
2001b) suggestion that receiving a strategy map improves overall communication of specific 
knowledge. Receiving a strategy map appears to increase truthful reporting among middle 
managers who are given subjective performance measures, and I have no evidence to suggest 
that this improvement would be accompanied by a decrease in the type of effort motivated by 
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those same subjective performance measures (on the contrary, Farrell et al. 2012 find that the 
communication of causal linkages improves effort allocation). 
3.5.5 Tests of H4 
I predict in H4 that middle managers who receive a strategy map, compared to middle 
managers who receive a non-causal list, are less biased in their performance evaluations of 
subordinates who provide disconfirming specific knowledge. As a test of this hypothesis, I use 
two-sample t-tests to directly examine the effect of receiving a strategy map on the dependent 
variable of subordinate evaluation, restricting this test to those who receive disconfirming 
specific knowledge. Inconsistent with H4, I do not find a significant effect of strategy map on 
subordinate evaluation (p = 0.733 one-tailed). Like in H3, I repeat this test among participants 
who have management experience at or above the median number of years (management 
experience ≥ 2 years). I find that, even among this subsample, strategy map has a non-significant 
effect on subordinate evaluation (n = 91, p = 0.634 one-tailed). These results do not support H4, 
suggesting that receiving a strategy map does not alleviate middle managers’ bias against 
subordinates who provide disconfirming specific knowledge.  
It is unclear why H4 is unsupported while H3 is supported even though both hypotheses 
are based upon the same theoretical grounds. From a statistical point of view, I note that my 
Sobel test from H2 suggest that impression management only partially explains the effect of 
specific knowledge type on subordinate evaluation. Although receiving a strategy map might 
affect the path indirectly leading from specific knowledge type to subordinate evaluation through 
impression management, the effect of a strategy map on that path might be overwhelmed by the 
direct path from specific knowledge type to subordinate evaluation. From a practical point of 
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view, this means that middle managers evaluate subordinates’ performance based on complex 
reasoning, some of which is unmeasured in my experiment and apparently unaffected by 
receiving a strategy map.  
As a supplemental test of H4, I repeat my multi-group path analysis from H3 (not 
tabulated). This time, however, I hold constant between the two strategy map conditions all 
coefficients and intercepts except for the coefficient of specific knowledge type predicting 
subordinate evaluation. I find a significant difference (χ2 = 7.03, p = 0.008) between the 
coefficient from participants who receive a strategy map (B = -0.492, p = 0.01 two-tailed) and 
the coefficient from participants who did not receive a strategy map (B = 0.09, p = 0.68 two-
tailed).  
Interpreting this supplemental test must be done conservatively because my experiment 
lacks the measures necessary for narrowing down the various possible reasons for this offsetting 
effect. Importantly, I do not have sufficient evidence from this test to conclude that receiving a 
strategy map worsens middle managers’ evaluation of subordinate performance. Instead, I am 
limited to suggesting that this result likely captures some alternative rationale underlying 
subordinate evaluation judgments—beyond impression management—which suggests poorer 
evaluations for subordinates who provide disconfirming specific knowledge. Furthermore, I can 
suggest that receiving a strategy map does not mitigate the effect of this unmeasured rationale.16  
                                                 
16 That is, without a strategy map, this alternative rationale covaries more fully with my impression management 
measures and thus the coefficient for the specific knowledge type indicator variable (which captures any such 
alternative rationales) is non-significant. With a strategy map, however, alternative rationales should covary less 
fully with my impression management measures because receiving a strategy map changes how specific knowledge 
type affects impression management. Thus, among those who receive a strategy map, the indicator variable that 
captures alternative negative effects of specific knowledge type on subordinate evaluation is significant and 
negative, compensating for the weakened impression management pathway. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this study, I have examined how middle managers react to different types of specific 
knowledge: disconfirming and confirming. I find evidence that both impression management and 
disconfirmation bias lead middle managers to report disconfirming specific knowledge to upper 
management less than confirming specific knowledge. I also find evidence that impression 
management and disconfirmation bias lead middle managers to give more positive performance 
evaluations to subordinates who provide confirming specific knowledge than to subordinates 
who provide disconfirming specific knowledge. These results extend prior knowledge sharing 
research by providing experimental evidence that middle managers given subjective performance 
measures are likely to be biased against sharing knowledge that might indicate they are investing 
a low level of effort and are likely to encourage subordinates to be similarly biased. Based on 
these results, the specific knowledge that upper management receives may be far more 
confirming of the firm’s strategy than the firm’s ground-level reality actually indicates. Although 
upper management might be able to adjust for this, information economics theory would suggest 
this departure from fully truthful reporting is a real loss of overall value and leads to a second-
best knowledge sharing solution. 
However, I find that receiving a strategy map alters middle managers’ incentives, making 
it more likely that middle managers will pass along disconfirming specific knowledge. This 
extends the subjective performance measurement literature by highlighting how management 
framing of such measures can positively affect agents’ reaction to them. This study suggests that 
upper management can overcome biased reporting due to subjective performance measurement 
by convincingly communicating that disconfirming specific knowledge is welcomed rather than 
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frowned upon. This communication might be effective whether it takes place through a strategy 
map or otherwise.17  
It is also important to note that I only find a strategy map effect among middle managers 
with at least two years of management experience.18 But it is not unreasonable to expect middle 
managers generally to have at least two years of management experience before being promoted 
to such a position. One limitation of my study is that it assumes firms use subjective performance 
measures to determine raises and promotions. I do not test a control condition in which middle 
managers are evaluated using less prominent subjective performance measures or none at all. 
Instead, I rely on prior research to suggest how subjective and objective performance measures 
would differ, and I expect subjective performance measures to be a driving cause of the 
impression management mediation in my study (see Prendergast 1993). While this leads to a 
more parsimonious experimental design, omitting explicit objective performance measures in 
this study suggests a future area for research: examining the treatment of specific knowledge 
among middle managers in settings where subjective performance measures play a relatively less 
prominent role. More emphasis on objective performance measures might alter the impression 
management calculus in a way that could eliminate or amplify the strategy map effect I observe 
in this study. 
Another possible limitation of my study is that I do not directly examine the effect a 
strategy map has on upper management’s willingness to revise the firm’s strategy once senior 
                                                 
17 The difficulty being that such communications could be disregarded as cheap talk by agents if upper management 
does not incur a meaningful cost to make them, as with a strategy map. 
18 One could also plausibly interpret the fact that I only found this effect among those with high experience as 
evidence that those with high experience likely also had more security in their current jobs, making them more 
willing to pass along disconfirming specific knowledge because they had less fear of supervisor retribution. I do not 
expect this alternative interpretation to significantly change the predictions from this study. 
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managers receive disconfirming specific knowledge. Ittner and Larcker (2003) suggest that upper 
management often does not empirically test the causal relationships of a strategy map because 
senior managers only select strategic goals they consider to have “self-evident” (91) causal 
relationships. Similarly, Huelsbeck et al. (2011) find that when senior managers are convinced of 
a strategy map it is difficult to change their mind with a disconfirming signal (see also Campbell 
et al. 2015). In this study, I interpret these findings from prior research to be emblematic of firm 
strategies generally, suggesting that upper management generally has significant inertia in favor 
of pursuing the firm’s chosen strategy, whatever the strategy’s format may be. As reviewed in 
Section 3.1, some prior research suggests that using a strategy map significantly helps managers 
recognize when a strategy revision is necessary (Cheng and Humphreys 2012; Tayler 2010). 
However, I cannot completely rule out the possibility that Ittner and Larcker, as well as 
Huelsbeck et al., have documented upper management convictions that are unique to strategy 
maps and that are not captured by the prior literature I cite in Section 3.1. Thus, it is possible that 
senior managers are more reluctant to revise the firm’s strategy when they use a strategy map. If 
this is the case, it represents a cost of using a strategy map that my study does not consider, and 
which may offset the knowledge sharing benefit for middle managers that I observe. I leave to 
future research the task of disentangling a strategy map’s effect on upper management’s 
willingness to revise the firm’s strategy in the face of disconfirming specific knowledge.  
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4.0  STUDY 2: DOES THE EFFECT OF A STRATEGY MAP ON 
APPROPRIATENESS JUDGMENTS DEPEND ON STRONG CAUSAL LINKAGES? 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A strategy map is a popular format for presenting the firm’s strategy in which upper management 
visually and explicitly links the firm’s strategic goals in a chain of cause-and-effect relationships, 
typically by drawing arrows between these goals. These arrows are called causal linkages 
because they communicate that accomplishing one strategic goal is at least partly responsible for 
achieving the next strategic goal in the chain. Framing the firm’s strategic goals as a strategy 
map can lead to several benefits, including improvements in managers’ judgments and decisions 
(Cheng and Humphreys 2012; Tayler 2010; Kaplan and Norton 2008; 2004; 2001b; Webb 2004; 
see also Gimbert et al. 2010; Beer et al. 2005). Researching these benefits helps managers decide 
whether to implement a strategy map and how to implement it. 
Prior research has also identified informative limitations to the benefits of a strategy map. 
For example, Webb (2004) finds evidence suggesting that a strategy map can improve goal 
commitment among managers, but that this effect relies on the strength of the cause-and-effect 
linkages between strategic goals. Specifically, he hypothesizes and finds that a causally-linked 
strategy that has “strong cause–effect links will result in greater commitment to financial 
performance goals” (931). A strong causal linkage, per Webb, is one that is “plausible and 
informative” (929). He manipulates the strength of the causal linkages, in part, by varying how 
easy it is for managers to understand exactly how the cause leads to the effect. He describes this 
aspect of the weak causal linkage condition as follows. 
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The cause–effect linkages among the nonfinancial objectives and measures are also 
designed to be weak. The percentage of […] employees that report to work on time is 
presented as being causally related to customer ratings of staff friendliness, but this 
linkage is questionable (939). 
In the current study, I examine another judgment effect of a strategy map and test 
whether this effect depends on strong causal linkages like those used by Webb (2004). 
Specifically, Cheng and Humphreys (2012) find that a strategy map affects vital manager 
judgments related to strategy revision, and I test whether these effects remain when a strategy 
map has weak causal linkages. Cheng and Humphreys (2012) find that providing managers with 
a strategy map improves, first, judgments about whether new information is relevant to 
evaluating the firm’s strategy (hereafter referred to as relevance judgments) and, second, 
judgments about whether that new information suggests the strategy is appropriate or 
inappropriate (hereafter referred to as appropriateness judgments).19  
Both judgments are essential for optimal strategy revision. Although I test both 
judgments, I primarily focus my analysis on appropriateness judgments because these judgments 
require managers to have a deeper understanding of the firm’s strategy and are thus more likely 
to depend on causal linkage strength. Also, appropriateness judgments are arguably more 
important than relevance judgments because one’s assessment of the appropriateness of the 
strategy directly suggests a course of action related to strategy revision, which can have a 
damaging effect on the firm if this course of action is not the correct action. Relevance 
judgments can suggest that information is relevant to revising the firm’s strategy, but do not 
suggest what this information means to revising the firm’s strategy.  
                                                 
19 Cheng and Humphreys require participants to make these relevance and appropriateness judgments based on what 
they recall from memory about the firm’s strategy, as might be expected in practice.  
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In my experiment, participants make relevance and appropriateness judgments like those 
described by Cheng and Humphreys (2012). I first find results comparable to theirs in that I find 
that a strategy map improves participants’ relevance judgments. However, my study’s primary 
contribution to this line of research is providing evidence that improved appropriateness 
judgments due to a strategy map’s causal linkages depends on strong causal linkages. In 
supplemental analysis, I find evidence consistent with this interaction being caused by two 
separate mechanisms. In one subsample of participants, I find that strong causal linkages have a 
positive effect on appropriateness judgments. In another subsample of participants, I find that 
weak causal linkages have a negative effect on appropriateness judgments. 
The results of this study provide additional guidance to firms considering a strategy map 
by demonstrating whether a firm should expect the same beneficial judgment effects from weak 
causal linkages as from strong causal linkages. It is especially important to know what features 
of a strategy map—such as the strength of its causal linkages—are necessary conditions for the 
benefits associated with a strategy map because strategy maps differ widely in terms of the 
strength of their causal linkages. Luft (2004) makes this point as well (utilizing, like Webb 2004, 
the term strategic performance measurement systems to describe performance measurement 
systems that use causally-linked strategic goals, such as a strategy map). 
A casual perusal of cases and practitioner articles describing strategic performance 
measurement systems (SPMS) yields examples of proposed causal links that range from 
the highly probable (for example, future revenues will be higher if more customers intend 
to purchase again) to the dubious (for example, customer satisfaction will increase if 
employees make more effort to cross-sell firm products) (Luft 2004, 959).  
Luft (2004) goes on to identify three reasons that weak causal linkages might exist. First, 
the costs for strengthening the linkages may be too high, especially when processes are new or 
otherwise “not well understood by anyone in the organization” (963). Second, those who create 
the firm’s strategy may have conflicting understandings of the cause-and-effect relationships that 
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drive firm performance. A strategy map would therefore be “the result of political compromise 
between these conflicting understandings rather than evidence-based determination of the actual 
drivers of profit” (963). Third, individuals who contribute to the firm’s strategy might “lobby for 
using nonfinancial measures that make them look best rather than the nonfinancial measures that 
contribute most to firm value” (963).  
Overcoming any of these can be costly, but my findings suggest only strong causal 
linkages are beneficial to managers’ appropriateness judgments and weak causal linkages may 
even be detrimental to them. Prior research suggests that firms often do not quantify a strategy 
map’s causal linkages (Ittner and Larcker 2003), and other prior studies cast doubt on the 
benefits associated with such quantification of causal linkages (Farrell et al. 2012; Huelsbeck et 
al. 2011). My findings suggest that apart from quantifying a strategy map’s causal linkages, it is 
beneficial for firms to ensure the causal linkages of a strategy map are strong. By ensuring causal 
linkages are strong, managers can maximize the strategy revision-related benefits of a strategy 
map. 
4.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4.2.1 Memory and Managers’ Judgments 
Firm strategies are management’s best guess of the optimal path for increased 
shareholder wealth. Meanwhile, managers are constantly receiving new information (see Day 
and Schoemaker 2005). Each piece of new information might lead to an important revision to 
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firm management’s best guess of the optimal firm strategy.20 Thus, some of the most important 
judgments managers make are relevance judgments and appropriateness judgments because these 
judgments affect revising the firm’s strategy. In practice, managers often must make relevance 
and appropriateness judgments without immediate access to the firm’s strategy. Instead they 
must make these judgments based on their understanding of the strategy encoded in memory.  
As such, Cheng and Humphreys (2012) expect a strategy map to lead to differences in 
relevance and appropriateness judgments due to differences in how the firm’s strategic goals are 
encoded in memory when managers are given a strategy map. Encoding refers to how the brain 
converts current cognitions into constructs that are stored as memories, categorized, and 
connected to other memories, allowing that current cognition to be recalled from memory later 
(e.g. Nickerson and Adams 1979; Anderson 1974; Shiffrin and Atkinson 1969; see also 
Otmakhova et al. 2013; Bliss and Collingridge 1993). There is enough overlap between how well 
managers understand the firm’s strategy and how well they encode the firm’s strategy in memory 
that I treat these concepts interchangeably. Understanding the firm’s strategy well is effectively 
the same as having encoded in memory the strategic goal details, interconnections, and 
categories of the firm’s strategy. 
To examine the effect of a strategy map on memory, it is important to distinguish 
between working memory and long-term memory. For example, Cheng and Humphreys (2012) 
give participants a distractor task to clear their working memory, meaning participants must rely 
on their long-term memory to make relevance and appropriateness judgments. Working memory 
is a temporary cache of recent cognitions that allows one to easily recall these most recent 
thoughts. Long-term memory, in contrast, is the collective body of cognitions encoded to 
                                                 
20 Or, also important, this new information could improve management’s confidence in the firm’s current strategy. 
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memory through categorization and through connection with other memories, with the object 
being to allow these cognitions to be recalled in the future (see Nickerson and Adams 1979; 
Anderson 1974; Shiffrin and Atkinson 1969; see also Otmakhova et al. 2013; Bliss and 
Collingridge 1993). Encoding a cognition to memory effectively means encoding it in long-term 
memory.  
Because Cheng and Humphreys (2012) use a distractor task, cognitions that participants 
must make to complete the distractor task occupy participants’ working memory, forcing out 
previous cognitions about the firm’s strategy. After the distractor task clears participants’ 
working memory, participants can only complete relevance judgments and appropriateness 
judgments by recalling the cognitions about the firm’s strategy they have encoded in long-term 
memory.21 Participants make these judgments in response to new external information, i.e. 
summaries of six articles from a business journal. That is, they determine if these article 
summaries are relevant to the task of evaluating the firm’s strategy and then determine whether 
the article summaries suggest the firm’s strategy is appropriate or inappropriate for the current 
business environment. Participants in the strategy map condition make better relevance and 
appropriateness judgments than those who receive a random list of goals or those who receive 
                                                 
21 By way of analogy, working memory is like an office desk. Items on the desk are easily retrieved because they are 
in essentially the same state as they were when placed on the desk and because they are easily identifiable and 
within line of sight. Working memory contains the cognitions that are most recent, and these cognitions are typically 
easy to recall in the same state as when they originated. Clearing the working memory with a distractor task is like 
clearing items off the desk to view a large map. Items on the desk are removed and must be filed away (like 
encoding them in long-term memory) or discarded (like forgetting them). In this analogy, long-term memory is like 
a filing cabinet. Once one has finished with the map, i.e. once the distractor task is complete, one removes the map 
and has a clear desk, i.e. a cleared working memory. If one wants to use an item that had been on the desk before 
viewing the map, the item must not be discarded (i.e. it must not be forgotten) and one must be able to find where it 
is in the filing cabinet (i.e. one must be able to recall it from long-term memory). Thus, by clearing working 
memory, Cheng and Humphreys place an emphasis on managers’ ability to retrieve strategy-related cognitions 
previously stored in long-term memory. 
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goals organized by balanced scorecard category (judgments from the latter two conditions are 
statistically equivalent).  
Thus, Cheng and Humphreys (2012) find that the communication of causal linkages 
improves both types of managers’ judgments because causal linkages help participants recall the 
firm’s strategy. In my first hypothesis, I predict this same effect for relevance and 
appropriateness judgments. Namely, I express my expectation that a strategy map’s causal 
linkages improve managers’ relevance and appropriateness judgments. 
H1: Managers who receive a strategy map make better relevance judgments and better 
appropriateness judgments than managers who receive a firm’s strategy without 
causal linkages. 
I generally expect the effect of causal linkages, as hypothesized in H1, to be stronger 
among those with less experience. This is because greater background knowledge can improve 
judgments such as relevance and appropriateness judgments, potentially substituting for the 
judgment-improving effects of a strategy map’s causal linkages. The more experience a manager 
has, the more likely it is that he or she has background knowledge that already equips him or her 
with stable framework of understanding for firm strategies and strategic goals (these frameworks 
could also be called schema; see Arbib 2002 for a review). These mental frameworks should help 
highly experienced managers recall the firm’s strategy for later judgments, leaving less room for 
detectable differences due to causal linkages.  
4.2.2 Causal Linkage Strength and Causal Relatedness 
Although causal linkages communicate to managers that there should be a cause-and-
effect relationship between strategic goals, this does not automatically mean the manager can 
make sense of that relationship. The strength of the causal linkage also plays a role, as shown by 
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Webb (2004). One important factor determining whether causal linkages are strong or weak is 
how easy it is to understand how the cause leads to the effect. In a study that can also be applied 
to managers, Pennington and Hastie (1992) report that jurors’ decisions are driven by whether 
the evidence coherently fits into a causal story. That is, jurors make their decisions based on 
whether they can understand why the perpetrator’s actions (the cause) lead to the harm or the 
infraction in question (the effect). If the relationship between the two is unclear—such as when 
jurors cannot decide between multiple pathways from the cause to the effect—then jurors are less 
likely to convict. Pennington and Hastie refer to this as the Story Model, and I expect it to 
describe managers’ decisions in the face of causal linkages as well.  
I use the term causal relatedness to describe how easy it is to understand why the cause 
leads to the effect, and therefore the term also describes causal linkage strength.22 The key 
feature of causal linkages with low causal relatedness is that they have multiple uncertain 
pathways through which the cause could lead to the effect. Because of these multiple uncertain 
pathways, it is difficult to fully understand why the cause leads to the effect. This is a 
characteristic that is shared by the weak causal linkage from Webb (2004), the two weak 
causally-linked measures reported by Luft (2004), and the weak causal linkages that I highlight 
below in this section (see Niven 2006). Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model is 
congruent with a larger literature on causal relatedness, which suggests that the easier it is to 
narrow down the reason causally-linked information is causally related, i.e. the greater its causal 
relatedness, then the more easily the information is read and recalled, affecting individuals’ 
                                                 
22 In this study, I use the term causal relatedness interchangeably with causal linkage strength. One could also 
describe causal relatedness as the ease with which one forms a causal story from a causal linkage, with forming a 
causal story being tantamount to understanding how the cause leads to the effect in a causal linkage. In this case, the 
terminology used has no effect on the hypothesized effects. 
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judgments (Mason and Just 2004; Singer et al. 1992; Duffy et al. 1990; Keenan et al. 1984; 
Myers et al. 1987; see also Zwaan and Radvansky 1998; Stock et al. 1991).23  
Luft (2004) confirms that weak causal linkages are prevalent in practice. Niven (2006) 
provides several more examples of strategy maps from practice. These strategy maps’ causal 
linkages differ in causal relatedness. In one example, he reprints a strategy map used by a 
government agency that makes a causal linkage between the goal optimize use of interns and the 
goal ensure regulatory compliance. There are several realistic cause-and-effect relationships that 
might exist, making it difficult to decide on one such relationship, limiting one’s understanding 
of this causal linkage and ultimately meaning low causal relatedness. First, interns may be recent 
graduates whose knowledge of regulatory details may be fresh. Second, there might be 
regulations that affect the usage of interns and optimizing their use allows for compliance with 
these regulations. Third, optimizing intern usage might free up experienced workers to spend 
more time on regulatory compliance. Because it is difficult to interpret this causal linkage, this 
causal linkage is like the “questionable” causal linkage in Webb’s (2004, 939) experiment, and 
would likely be included in what Luft (2004) refers to as “dubious” (959) causal linkages. 
In another example, Niven (2006) reprints Brother International’s strategy map, which 
has an outer circular ring of arrows and four goal categories inside this ring of arrows. None of 
these strategic goals in these goal categories is explicitly connected to any other strategic goal. 
                                                 
23 For example, consider the following causally-linked pair of sentences (used by Mason and Just 2004). Joey’s 
crazy mother became furiously angry with him. The next day his body was covered with bruises. These two 
sentences present a story that is coherent and has only one plausible relationship between Joey’s mother getting 
angry with him (the cause) and Joey being bruised the next day (the effect). Thus, a causal linkage between these 
two would be strong because it has high causal relatedness and should be easy to encode in long-term memory 
(Myers et al. 1987). In contrast, another causally-linked sentence pair demonstrates low causal relatedness (also used 
by Mason and Just 2004). Joey went to a neighbor’s house to play. The next day his body was covered with bruises. 
There are multiple realistic reasons that going to a neighbor’s house to play (the cause) leads to Joey being bruised 
the next day (the effect). Therefore, it is a weaker causal linkage and would be harder to encode in long-term 
memory. 
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However, the ring of arrows clearly communicates causal linkages between the categories, with 
one goal category somehow leading to the next goal category. This is another way in which 
causal linkages can be weak: because they join multiple causes to multiple effects, leaving 
several possible causal relationships among several possible combinations of goals. In their 
examples explaining strategy maps, Kaplan and Norton (2008; 2004; 2001b) also often use 
unspecific causal linkages connecting groups of goals.  
4.2.3 Causal Relatedness and Appropriateness Judgments 
The first judgments managers make about new information are relevance judgments, 
which require only a surface-level understanding of the firm’s strategy. Relevance judgments are 
akin to remembering the title of a chapter or the bottom line of an income statement. Cheng and 
Humphreys (2012) argue that relevance judgments are a “categorization process whereby 
managers try to fit the external information item to their cognitive representation” of the firm’s 
strategy (903-904). The critical test of a relevance judgment is whether the new information 
“belongs” to the same category as the firm’s strategic goals “and therefore is relevant to” the 
firm’s strategy (904; see Markman and Wisniewski 1997 for a review of categorization; see also 
Corneille et al. 2006). Relevance judgments are an economical way to quickly flag relevant 
information, perhaps for a subsequent appropriateness judgment, without engaging in the time-
consuming task of analyzing the meaning of irrelevant new information. As such, I do not expect 
causal linkage strength to affect relevance judgments significantly because I expect the 
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incremental benefit of high causal relatedness to be minimal for this relatively simple recall 
task.24 
For appropriateness judgements, however, a more profound level of detail about the 
firm’s strategy must be recalled. Determining whether new information suggests the firm’s 
strategy is appropriate or inappropriate requires managers to recall sufficient details about the 
firm’s strategic goals to understand the predictions and assumptions associated with those 
strategic goals. Then managers must compare the new information with those predictions and 
assumptions. Failure to properly recall enough of the details about the firm’s strategic goals to 
understand the predictions and assumptions of these goals can lead to an incorrect understanding 
of the appropriateness of the firm’s strategy, making it more difficult to correctly revise the 
firm’s strategy. Prior research suggests that greater causal relatedness improves one’s recall of 
details about causally-linked material (e.g. Mason and Just 2004; Keenan et al. 1984). This leads 
to the prediction that causal relatedness moderates a greater causal linkage benefit for 
appropriateness judgments. That is, the predicted H1 benefit from causal linkages is greater for 
appropriateness judgments when causal linkages have greater causal relatedness. 
H2: The positive effect that causal linkages have on appropriateness judgments is greater 
when strategic goals have high causal relatedness than when the strategic goals have 
low causal relatedness. 
                                                 
24 An example of a relevance judgment from an academic setting is when a new edition of an accounting journal is 
released. A researcher might browse the articles in this new edition to determine which, if any, are relevant to his or 
her research projects. To judge the relevance of these new articles, the researcher will likely first read the title and 
abstract to determine the topical and/or methodological category of these new articles and then compare these 
categories to the categories he or she recalls from his or her current research projects. This is more economical than 
reading each new article to determine if it is relevant, and it is not necessary to recall every detail of one’s current 
research projects to compare their categories to the new article categories. Once a researcher determines an article is 
relevant, the researcher likely recalls the details of his or her corresponding research project(s) to compare them with 
details he or she reads from the body of the article text to determine the implications of this new article on his or her 
project(s)—like an appropriateness judgment. 
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As with H1, I generally expect this effect more among those with low experience. Low 
experience individuals are less likely than high experience individuals to have background 
knowledge that will otherwise help these individuals recall details of the firm’s strategy. The 
background knowledge associated with experience could improve one’s recall of firm details 
independent of the strategic goals’ causal relatedness and effectively make low causal 
relatedness causal linkages stronger. Like my reasoning with H1, I expect those with low 
experience to have less background knowledge and thus greater differences between the effect of 
strong causal linkages and weak causal linkages.  
4.3 METHOD 
4.3.1 Experimental Design 
In my 2 × 2 experiment, I manipulate one between-subject factor (the strategy map 
manipulation) and one within-subject factor (the causal relatedness manipulation). For my 
between-subject strategy map manipulation, I randomly assign each participant to one of two 
levels: strategy map and non-causal list. I make these manipulations by altering how strategic 
goals are presented to participants. For both conditions, I present participants with two strategic 
goals at a time. I refer to each goal-pair as a mini-strategy, and I present a total of sixteen mini-
strategies to each participant (I explain this further below). Those in the strategy map condition 
receive, for each mini-strategy I present to them, an arrow that indicates a causal linkage 
between the two strategic goals of the mini-strategy. Those in the non-causal list condition 
receive the same mini-strategies, but I do not present them with any arrows to indicate causal 
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linkages between the strategic goals of these mini-strategies.25 I make this manipulation 
between-subject rather than within-subject to maintain experimental control. Specifically, if a 
participant sees an arrow to indicate a causal linkage in one mini-strategy but sees no arrow to 
indicate a causal linkage in the next mini-strategy, that participant could be primed by the first 
mini-strategy to mentally infer a causal linkage between the two goals of the second mini-
strategy. Such an outcome could confound my strategy map manipulation.  
Before describing my within-subject manipulation, I explain how I create the mini-
strategies that I present to participants. Again, mini-strategies are pairs of strategic goals, and I 
present participants with one mini-strategy at a time. I present each participant with sixteen mini-
strategies, for a total of thirty-two strategic goals. I create these mini-strategies from eight four-
goal strategic themes. For my purposes, a strategic theme is a chain of four goals—one from 
each balanced scorecard category—with a unifying business topic. No mini-strategy contains 
strategic goals from different strategic themes, and therefore each strategic theme evenly yields 
two mini-strategies. Each participant sees the same thirty-two goals from the same eight strategic 
themes.  
I make my within-subject causal relatedness manipulation by simply altering how goal-
pairs from the four-goal strategic themes are grouped into mini-strategies. I assign four of the 
strategic themes from which I create mini-strategies to each of my two causal relatedness levels: 
high causal relatedness and low causal relatedness. Strategic goals in a strategy map are 
generally expected to flow through the four balanced scorecard categories in the following order: 
learning and growth goals to internal processes goals, internal processes goals to customer 
                                                 
25 Also, as detailed in Section 4.3.3, I explicitly describe the strategy map as being a “strategy map” that “arranges 
the firm’s goals into cause-and-effect relationships.” Adding this description to the strategy map condition is in line 
with the procedures followed by Cheng and Humphreys (2012). 
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goals, and customer goals to financial goals (Kaplan and Norton 2004; 2001a; 2001b). For 
themes in the high causal relatedness condition, I make mini-strategies by drawing strategic goal-
pairs from adjacent balanced scorecard categories in that generally expected order. That is, if a 
strategic theme is in the high causal relatedness condition, I create one mini-strategy from the 
theme’s learning and internal processes goals and another mini-strategy from the theme’s 
customer and financial goals.26 Because these goals are from adjacent categories, they are more 
easily bridged, making it easier to understand the cause-and-effect relationships between them.  
I create mini-strategies in the low causal relatedness condition by pairing strategic goals 
from non-adjacent balanced scorecard categories. Specifically, I skip a category in the chain to 
find goal-pairs to make into mini-strategies. If a strategic theme is in the low causal relatedness 
condition, I make one mini-strategy from the theme’s learning and customer goals and another 
from the theme’s internal process and financial goal.27 The fact that mini-strategies in the low 
causal relatedness condition use strategic goals from non-adjacent categories makes it likely that 
participants can plausibly infer multiple ways that one goal causes the next. Thus, in this 
condition, it is relatively more difficult to narrow down possible causal relationships to just one. 
                                                 
26 By random assignment, I counterbalance which four themes are assigned to the two causal relatedness conditions. 
That is, for each theme, half of the participants learn of its four strategic goals through two high causal relatedness 
mini-strategies and the other half of participants learn of its four strategic goals through two low causal relatedness 
mini-strategies. Counterbalancing helps control for idiosyncratic differences between how the themes are written. 
When I add an indicator variable to account for this random assignment in Section 4.4.3, it does not change either of 
my chief hypothesis tests for H1 and H2. This indicator variable is not significant (coefficient = 0.04, p = 0.49 two-
tailed) when added to my test of relevance judgments (see regression in Table 3 Panel A). However, the indicator 
variable is significant (coefficient = 0.13, p = 0.03 two-tailed) when added to my test of appropriateness judgments 
(see regression in Table 4 Panel A). This significant result does not change the interpretation of my results. 
27 Some prior research suggests that indirect causal relationships can strengthen over time. That is, if a person learns 
that A causes B and that B causes C, then over time—especially if one has a chance to sleep—the indirect 
relationship between the A and C items grows stronger in long-term memory (Coutanche et al. 2013; Ellenbogen et 
al. 2007; see also Schlichting and Preston 2016; 2015). Although I use weak mini-strategies that technically conform 
to a similar A-to-C pattern of indirect causal relationships, I do not expect my results to be affected by this memory 
phenomenon observed by prior research. First, the timeframe of my study is too short. Second, I randomize the order 
in which mini-strategies are presented, meaning the B item is likely difficult for participants to connect to the A and 
C items. 
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To avoid order effects, I randomize the order in which mini-strategies are presented in both 
causal relatedness conditions. 
I provide an example of both causal relatedness conditions in Figure 6. This figure shows 
a complete strategic theme and how I group pairs of goals from that strategic theme into high and 
low causal relatedness mini-strategies. The mini-strategies in this figure are in the strategy map 
condition, i.e. with arrows to indicate causal linkages. If these mini-strategies were in the non-
causal list condition, the causal relatedness manipulation would operate in the same way, but 
without any arrows between strategic goals. 
Figure 6: Study 2 Causal Relatedness Manipulation 
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One critical advantage of manipulating this factor within-subject rather than between-
subject is that it adds realism. Actual firm strategies often include a multitude of strategic goals 
and some of these goals will have high causal relatedness and some of these goals will have low 





causal relatedness. Testing how participants respond to both causal relatedness conditions is 
more useful for informing practitioners because it better simulates what managers face in 
practice. 
4.3.2 Participants 
Participants are Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. I screen participants using 
requirements similar to those tested and validated by prior studies (e.g. Farrell et al. 2017; also 
see Mason and Suri 2012 for a review). Namely, I screen for participants who have the “master” 
designation, have a favorable task completion rating of at least 95%, and have successfully 
completed 1,000 or more tasks. Using these screening methods, I gather 375 complete participant 
responses. I further screen these responses for those from an IP address that was unacceptable (I 
exclude three IP addresses from outside of the United States, one IP address from the city where 
I was based at the time, and twenty-two IP addresses that are duplicated among multiple 
responses).28 To ensure participant responses are meaningful, I give participants three separate 
attention check questions, in which I instruct them which answer choice to select.29 I exclude 
results from the 19 participants who failed any of these attention checks. The final sample 
consists of 330 complete participant responses. Participants earn a flat fee for completing the 
                                                 
28 I exclude responses from IP addresses outside of the United States because I cannot independently confirm 
Amazon’s verification procedures. I am aware of reports that some workers from outside the United States have 
circumvented those procedures in the past. I exclude IP addresses from the city where I was based at the time as an 
extra experimental control to exclude responses that may be from individuals at my institution or otherwise 
connected to me who might have known the study was being conducted and knew of its experimental design. 
29 These attention checks are straightforward about which answer is the correct answer. If a participant misses one of 
these attention checks, I must conclude that this participant is not paying sufficient attention to the questions or 
instructions for their responses to be meaningful. 
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study ($3) and have an opportunity for a $1 bonus if they pay close attention throughout the 
study (I describe this bonus opportunity below).  
4.3.3 Experimental Task and Procedures 
The experiment consists of three stages. Stage one is the encoding stage, in which I 
present sixteen mini-strategies and participants encode them in long-term memory. First, 
participants learn that they have recently been hired as a regional manager in a fictional bank in 
the United States (i.e. the firm), and that upper management has recently developed a new 
strategy for the firm. Participants in the strategy map condition learn that the firm’s strategy “is 
in a format called a strategy map,” which “arranges the firm’s goals into cause-and-effect 
relationships.” This is like the instructions provided by Cheng and Humphreys (2012) to 
participants in the strategy map condition. Explicitly stating that the intent of a strategy map is to 
communicate causal linkages helps ensure a clear manipulation between my strategy map and 
non-causal list conditions. 
Participants in all conditions then learn of the firm’s strategic goals, mini-strategy by 
mini-strategy. These mini-strategies are provided one at a time with no opportunity to review 
prior mini-strategies. No mini-strategy is repeated. I also randomize the order in which the 
sixteen mini-strategies are presented. For each mini-strategy, the first strategic goal is shown for 
ten seconds and then both strategic goals are shown for ten seconds. An arrow is shown between 
the two goals if the participant has been assigned to the strategy map condition. I advance 
participants from mini-strategy to mini-strategy automatically to ensure consistent timing across 
all mini-strategies. Otherwise, participants might develop an affinity toward the high causal 
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relatedness mini-strategies, affecting how long they spend reading those mini-strategies and thus 
altering the overall salience of those mini-strategies in later judgments.30  
In stage two, participants first perform a distractor task to clear their working memory. In 
this distractor task, participants have one minute to count the number of times the letter “c” 
appears in a short passage on an unrelated topic. To maintain proper control over this distractor 
task, participants are not permitted to advance from this screen until one minute has elapsed. 
After one minute, participants are automatically advanced to the next screen where they input 
how many times they counted the letter “c.” Then participants are instructed that regional 
managers are responsible for assisting in the ongoing evaluation of the appropriateness of the 
firm’s strategy and that they will see several article summaries that may or may not be relevant 
to that evaluation. In a random order, participants read article summaries and for each article 
summary respond to (1) a question about the relevance of the article summary to evaluating the 
firm strategy and (2) a question about whether the article summary suggests the firm’s strategy is 
appropriate or inappropriate. These questions test the primary dependent variables of interest to 
this study, i.e. relevance and appropriateness judgments, and are comparable to those questions 
used by Cheng and Humphreys (2012). 
In the final stage, stage three, I ask participants several demographic and control 
questions. I explain these control questions in Section 4.3.5, in which I describe the control 
variables that I use for my analysis. As a tool to ensure participants pay close attention to the 
goals presented in stage one, even though participants are located remotely, I give participants a 
short quiz at the end of stage three. In this quiz, they are shown a set of goals and indicate 
whether they saw these goals in stage one. Half of the goals shown in the quiz are foil goals, 
                                                 
30 Also, this pattern is like prior studies on causal relatedness (e.g. Mason and Just 2004). 
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designed to be plausibly mistaken for the actual goals seen. Participants receive a $1 bonus if 
they complete the quiz with a score of 75% or more correct. The quiz appears to be an effective 
attention-holding tool for stage one (the average score on the quiz is 77%) and for the other 
stages as well (only 19 participant responses fail attention check questions—two of which are in 
stage two and one of which is in stage three). 
4.3.4 Dependent Variables 
In stage two, I generally follow Cheng and Humphreys’ (2012) procedures and present 
participants with twelve article summaries, which I describe as originating from recent articles in 
a reputable business press. Four article summaries are irrelevant to the firm’s strategy, four 
article summaries are relevant and suggest a strategic goal is appropriate, and the remaining four 
article summaries are relevant and suggest a strategic goal is inappropriate.31  In other words, the 
twelve article summaries can be grouped evenly into three subcategories: irrelevant, appropriate, 
and inappropriate. In each of these three subcategories, I use two article summaries related to a 
high causal relatedness mini-strategy and two article summaries related to a low causal 
relatedness mini-strategy. This last design feature ensures I can perform statistical tests 
comparing scores across the two causal relatedness conditions. 
For each article summary, I first ask participants, on a five-point scale, the degree to 
which they believe the article summary is relevant to the evaluation of the firm’s strategy, where 
a higher score indicates more relevance and a lower score indicates less relevance. A score of 
                                                 
31 Cheng and Humphreys (2012) use six article summaries, and divide them so two of them are in each of the 
categories described in this section. I am presenting a strategy with more goals than they do, making it reasonable to 
present participants with more article summaries without dramatically changing the balance of goals and article 
summaries. 
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zero, the lowest possible value, indicates that the item is irrelevant. This is the relevance 
judgment. Then, for each article summary participants rate as relevant (i.e. rated more than zero), 
I ask participants the degree to which the article summary suggests the firm’s strategy is 
appropriate or inappropriate. I use a six-point force-choice scale for the appropriateness 
judgment, where a higher number indicates more appropriate and a lower number indicates more 
inappropriate. When forming the dependent variables for relevance judgment and 
appropriateness judgment, I reverse-code participant responses to irrelevant article summaries 
(for relevance judgments) and to inappropriate article summaries (for appropriateness 
judgments).32 For the article summaries that I present, the end points of the scale are the most 
appropriate answer.33 Therefore, relevance judgment and appropriateness judgment stand for 
participants’ degree of correctness in the respective judgments, with higher always meaning 
more correct. 
4.3.5 Independent Variables and Controls 
I create indicator variables to represent my manipulations as follows. The indicator 
variable strategy map is coded as one when the participant receives a strategy map, i.e. causal 
linkages between strategic goals, and it is coded as zero when the participant receives a non-
                                                 
32 For example, assume there’s an irrelevant item (which should be zero, meaning irrelevant) and a participant 
responds to this item with a four, meaning highly relevant. I code this response as a zero for my analysis. This can 
be interpreted to mean the response is as distant from the correct answer as possible. If another participant responds 
to the same irrelevant question with a one, meaning slightly relevant, that participant’s response is analyzed as a 
three. This can be interpreted to mean that that response is almost the correct answer. 
33 Furthermore, even if an article summary were written in a way that suggests the correct answer is not at the end 
point of the scale, I use fixed effects control variables (described below) to adjust the means of responses to 
individual article summaries. This control is designed specifically to adjust for such qualitative or idiomatic 
differences between article summaries. 
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causal list, i.e. no causal linkages between strategic goals. The indicator variable causal 
relatedness is coded as one for relevance and appropriateness judgments that pertain to the six 
article summaries for high causal relatedness mini-strategies and coded as zero for judgments 
that pertain to the six article summaries for low causal relatedness mini-strategies. Strategy map 
necessarily varies by participant, and causal relatedness varies from article summary to article 
summary. In sum, each participant has six of each dependent variable observations from article 
summaries coded as zero for causal relatedness and six from article summaries coded as one for 
causal relatedness. I also use a set of eleven indicator variables that I refer to collectively as 
article summary fixed effects. As fixed effects indicator variables, no more than one variable is 
ever coded as one at a time (although for one of the article summaries, all fixed effects indicator 
variables are coded as zero). The article summary fixed effects variables reduce noise that 
otherwise may arise due to subjective or qualitative differences in the way individual article 
summaries are written.34 
In stage three, I ask participants manipulation check questions, demographic questions, 
and control questions. For my check on the strategy map manipulation, I ask participants to think 
about those times two goals were presented on the screen at the same time, and then ask them to 
indicate how much they agree with the notion that the firm expects those two goals to have a 
cause-and-effect relationship. Participants respond on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 
(strongly agree). This reflects the construct I am attempting to manipulate with the strategy map 
manipulation: the explicit expectation of a cause-and-effect relationship.  
                                                 
34 When I remove this set of variables it does not affect the significance or direction of my main test of H1, but my 
main test of H2 does move outside of the standard range of significance (the coefficient term testing H2 is p = 0.08 
one-tailed). I expect this change to be due to statistical noise from recording appropriateness judgments about twelve 
different article summaries with varying content. 
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For my check on the causal relatedness manipulation, I present two of the mini-strategies 
that participants see in stage one: a high causal relatedness mini-strategy and a low causal 
relatedness mini-strategy. These mini-strategies are presented with or without causal linkages in 
accordance with the participants’ strategy map condition. I instruct participants to assume there 
is indeed a cause-and-effect relationship between the two goals shown on the screen. Then I ask 
participants how much they felt it was “clear how the first goal causes the second goal” for each 
of the two mini-strategies, on scale of 1 (“very unclear”) to 6 (“very clear”). By comparing 
answers across mini-strategies from different causal relatedness conditions, I can check to see if 
participants can understand the causal relationship for a mini-strategy with high causal 
relatedness more clearly than a mini-strategy with low causal relatedness. 
My stage three demographic questions include age, gender, educational attainment, 
student status, and business education (i.e. whether participants have completed a degree in 
business). I also ask participants how many years of overall work experience they have and how 
many years of management experience they have. For use as control variables, I also ask 
participants their familiarity with the strategy map and with banking in general. Familiarity with 
banking is an especially important control variable given that the firm in the scenario for this 
experiment is a bank and the firm’s strategic goals relate to banking. 
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4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Manipulation Checks 
In Table 2, I present descriptive statistics for several variables of interest. Relevance 
judgment (Panel A) and appropriateness judgment (Panel B) values are broken out by 
experimental condition. Panel C shows the mean and, where applicable, standard deviation and 
quartile measures for participant age, gender, educational background, work experience, 
management experience, and familiarity with the balanced scorecard and the strategy map.35 
Table 2: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Relevance Judgment; Means (standard deviations) 
 Non-causal list Strategy Map Row Averages 
Low Causal Relatedness 
2.96 
(1.48) 
n = 1,014 
3.03 
(1.45) 
n = 966 
2.99  
(1.47) 
n = 1,980 
High Causal Relatedness 
2.89 
(1.51) 
n = 1,014 
3.01  
(1.52) 
n = 966 
2.95 
(1.51) 




n = 2,028 
3.02  
(1.49) 
n = 1,932 
2.97  
(1.49) 










                                                 
35 None of these variables differs significantly across strategy map conditions (p > 0.05 one-tailed—in either 
direction), except for familiarity with strategy maps. As would be expected, familiarity with strategy maps is 
significantly higher (p = 0.03, one-tailed) when participants are in the strategy map condition (mean = 1.2, standard 
deviation = 1.18) than when they are in the non-causal list condition (mean = 0.97, standard deviation = 1.11).  
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Table 2: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Appropriateness Judgment; Means (standard deviations) 
 Non-causal list Strategy Map Row Averages 
Low Causal Relatedness 
4.17 
(1.59) 
n = 801 
4.07  
(1.61) 
n = 746 
4.12  
(1.60) 
n = 1,547 
High Causal Relatedness 
4.22 
(1.65) 
n = 799 
4.28  
(1.58) 
n = 727 
4.25 
(1.61) 




n = 1,600 
4.17  
(1.60) 
n = 1,473 
4.18  
(1.61) 
n = 3,073 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 
 





Age 330 40.32 19.42 31 37 46 
Gender (Female) 330 0.48 (156) — — — — 
Number of Business classes 330 2.46 4.59 0 1 2 
Business degree 330 0.10 (32) — — — — 
Current Student 330 0.06 (19) — — — — 
Work Experience 330 17.88 11.04 10 15 25 
Management Experience 
 
330 3.70 5.32 0 2 5 
Educational Attainment: 
High School/GED 330 0.15 (50) — — — — 
Some college 330 0.35 (114) — — — — 
Bachelors 330 0.42 (138) — — — — 
Graduate 
 
330 0.08 (28) — — — — 
Familiarity: (0 to 4 scale) 
Balanced Scorecard  330 0.57 0.97 0 0 1 
Strategy Map 330 1.05 1.13 0 1 2 
Banking 
 
330 2.32 1.04 2 2 3 
 
I performed two manipulation checks, described in Section 4.3.5, to ensure that my two 
experimental manipulations match the constructs they are intended to reflect. First, in the 
strategy map manipulation check, I ask participants how much they agree that the firm expects a 
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cause-and-effect relationship between mini-strategies presented in stage one. This manipulation, 
as expected, varies significantly (p < 0.01 one tailed) between participants who received a 
strategy map (mean = 5.50; standard deviation = 0.87) and participants who received a non-
causal list (mean = 3.98; standard deviation = 1.61). The strategy map manipulation passes its 
manipulation check because there is more of an expectation of a cause-and-effect relationship 
among those in the strategy map condition than among those in the non-causal list condition. 
Participants provided with the causal linkages of a strategy map have a more overt rationale for 
attempting to understand the causal relationships between strategic goals. 
I check the causal relatedness manipulation by presenting two mini-strategies previously 
presented to participants and by asking whether it is clear how the first goal causes the second, 
under the assumption that the two goals of the mini-strategy do indeed have a cause-and-effect 
relationship. One of these mini-strategies has high causal relatedness and the other has low 
causal relatedness. I ask this check question on a six-point scale from 1 to 6. Participants report 
that it is significantly clearer (p < 0.01 one-tailed) how the goals cause each other when the mini-
strategy has high causal relatedness (mean = 5.46; standard deviation = 0.86) than when the 
mini-strategy has low causal relatedness (mean = 2.88; standard deviation = 1.55). This results 
supports my expectation that the causal relatedness manipulation affects how easily one can 
understand the cause-and-effect relationship of a causal linkage. 
4.4.2 Tests of H1 
As hypothesized in H1, I expect that those who receive a strategy map with causal 
linkages between the goals will make better relevance and appropriateness judgments than those 
who do not. To test this, I use a mixed multiple linear regression model that appropriately 
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accounts for repeated measures. That is, this form of regression accounts the fact that I collect 
twelve relevance and twelve appropriateness judgment observations from each participant rather 
than erroneously assuming each dependent variable observation is from an independent, 
randomly-assigned participant.  
My first regression model uses relevance judgment—which measures the correctness of 
participants’ relevance judgments—as the dependent variable. The predictors in this model are 
strategy map and article summary fixed effects (a set of indicator variables that identify the 
article summary a dependent variable observation comes from). As shown in Table 3 Panel A, I 
find support for H1, in the form of a significant positive coefficient for strategy map (p = 0.046 
one-tailed) predicting relevance judgments. This result replicates Cheng and Humphreys’ (2012) 
result that the causal linkages of a strategy map improve relevance judgments. My confirmation 
of this result is important because I use a different set of participants, a unique scenario, and I 
increase the number of strategic goals the firm has. Still, I find that a strategy map’s causal 
linkages help managers judge how relevant new information is to strategy revision.36 Practically 
speaking, managers who efficiently and accurately judge the relevance of new information are 
less likely to waste time on irrelevant information and are less likely to discard truly relevant 
information that the firm needs to revise its strategy. 
My second regression to test H1 is the same as the first, except that it predicts 
appropriateness judgment as the dependent variable. These results are shown in Table 3 Panel B. 
Inconsistent with H1, I find that strategy map is not a significant predictor of appropriateness 
judgment (p = 0.47 one-tailed). Although this is technically a failed test of H1, it is still 
                                                 
36 In line with my reasoning for H1, causal relatedness is not a significant predictor (p = 0.35 two-tailed) if I add it 
as a predictor to the models in Table 3 Panel A and Table 3 Panel B. 
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consistent with the overall appropriateness judgment reasoning from Section 4.2. Namely, 
appropriateness judgments require managers to recall substantial details about the firm’s 
strategy. It is hardly inconceivable that a group of causal linkages bridging a mixture of low 
causal relatedness and high causal relatedness strategic goals would be insufficient to improve 
managers’ recall of such details. This mixture of causal relatedness is most likely why my results 
for H1—as they pertain to appropriateness judgments—differ from Cheng and Humphreys’ 
results. 
Table 3: Study 2 Tests of H1 
Panel A: Test of H1 for Relevance Judgments 
Relevance Judgmentit = β0 + β1 Strategy Mapit + Article Summary Fixed Effectsi + ui + εit 
 Coefficient z-value p-value (one-tailed) 
Strategy Map 0.10 1.69 0.046 
Article Summary  
Fixed Effects — (868.08 χ
2) <0.01 
Constant 4.35 54.63 <0.01 
R2 (Relevance Judgment): 0.172; Wald χ2 (12) = 870.93 (p < 0.01) 
 
Panel B: Test of H1 for Appropriateness Judgments 
Appropriateness Judgmentit = β0 + β1 Strategy Mapit + Article Summary Fixed Effectsi + ui + εit 
 Coefficient z-value p-value (one-tailed) 
Strategy Map <0.01 0.08 0.47 
Article Summary  
Fixed Effects — (1239.52 χ
2) <0.01 
Constant 3.93 28.94 <0.01 
R2 (Appropriateness Judgment): 0.277; Wald χ2 (12) = 1239.69 (p < 0.01) 
 
Panel C: Supplemental Boundary Tests of H1 
 β1 Strategy Map (p-value, one-tailed) 
 Below-median subsample  Above-median subsample  
Work Experience 0.18 (0.02) 0.02 (0.37) 
Management Experience 0.12 (0.08) 0.09 (0.24) 
Age 0.13 (0.04) 0.05 (0.28) 
Business degree 0.09 (0.07) 0.11 (0.27) 
Familiarity with Banking 0.20 (0.04) 0.06 (0.16) 
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Furthermore, I expect that the effect observed in H1 should be weaker among certain 
subsamples because these subsamples should already possess more background knowledge and 
thus more alternative means of recalling surface-level information about strategic goals, which is 
necessary for relevance judgments, without the help of a strategy map. In a supplemental test of 
H1, I create subsamples based on above-median and below-median work experience (median = 
15), management experience (median = 2), age (median = 37), as well as two subsamples based 
on whether the participants have a business degree (business degree n = 32). Then, I re-run my 
H1 test in each of the four subsamples. As summarized in Table 2 Panel B, for both median 
splits, the strategy map coefficient is significant and positive, at either the 95% or 90% 
confidence level, for those in the below-median subsamples (or those without a business degree) 
and non-significant at the 90% confidence level, for those in the above-median subsamples (or 
those with a business degree).37 Familiarity with banking also follows the pattern shown above, 
with high familiarity leading causal linkages to have a weaker effect than low familiarity. This 
supplemental test suggests that strategy maps have more of an effect on relevance judgments for 
managers with less experience. As might be expected from the non-significant effect of my H1 
test on appropriateness judgments, I test and do not find support (not tabulated) for an H1 effect 
on appropriateness judgment among the subsamples shown in Panel A of Table 3 (p > 0.05 one-
tailed in all cases). 
                                                 
37 Work experience (p < 0.01 two-tailed), management experience (p = 0.03 two-tailed), and possession of a 
business degree (p = 0.04 two-tailed) are significant positive predictors of relevance judgment when I add each of 
them, one at a time, as a predictor in the regression shown in Table 4 Panel A. Participant age is not a significant 
predictor when tested as a continuous variable (p = 0.47 two-tailed), but is significant at the 90% confidence level (p 
= 0.07 two-tailed) if I use an indicator variable coded as one for participant’s at or above the median age. Familiarity 
with banking is not a significant predictor whether I test it as a continuous variable (p = 0.56 two-tailed) or a 
dichotomous variable (p = 0.38 two-tailed). 
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4.4.3 Tests of H2 
I hypothesize in H2 that managers’ appropriateness judgments are improved by causal 
linkages more when those causal linkages connect goals with high causal relatedness than when 
those goals connect goals with low causal relatedness. I predict this because causal linkages 
explicitly indicate to managers that they should try to interpret a cause-and-effect relationship 
between strategic goals, whereas high causal relatedness allows managers to succeed in this 
interpretation, which is what I expect to ultimately affect appropriateness judgments. This 
prediction describes an interaction between my two manipulated variables. Therefore, if this 
hypothesis is correct, the interaction term between causal relatedness and strategy map will have 
a significant and positive coefficient when predicting participants’ appropriateness judgments. 
This prediction for mean appropriateness judgment is shown in Figure 7, broken out by 
experimental condition. Effectively, H2 predicts that the slope of the high causal relatedness line 
will be steeper than the slope of the low causal relatedness line. 




Like my first hypothesis, I test H2 with a mixed multiple linear regression model. This 
regression model uses appropriateness judgment as the dependent variable. The predictors in this 
N O N - C A U S A L  L I S T S T R A T E G Y  M A P
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model are causal relatedness, strategy map, the interaction between strategy map and causal 
relatedness, and article summary fixed effects. I show these results in Table 4 Panel A. 
Consistent with H2, I find a significant positive coefficient for the interaction term (p = 
0.02 one-tailed), suggesting that strategy map has a greater improving effect on appropriateness 
judgment when causal relatedness is coded as one.38 This finding confirms that greater causal 
relatedness enhances the effect of causal linkages. This interaction is also evident from Figure 8, 
which shows actual appropriateness judgment means.  
To further explore this effect, I perform simple effects regressions broken out by causal 
relatedness condition (not tabulated). Simple effects tests such as this help interpret interactions 
by testing one term at different levels of the other term, which is held constant. However, when I 
do this, I find that strategy map has a non-significant negative effect on appropriateness 
judgments in the low causal relatedness condition (p = 0.13 one-tailed) and in the high causal 
relatedness condition a positive effect on appropriateness judgments that is only significant at the 
90% confidence level (p = 0.09 one-tailed). My simple effects tests could fail because there are 
more than one effect contributing to the interaction reported in Table 4 Panel A. I address this 
below, after discussing my subsample analysis, to provide additional context for my failed 




                                                 
38 In Section 4.2.3, I do not expect an H2 effect for relevance judgments because these judgments require a relatively 
superficial degree of recall of the firm’s strategy. Consistent with this, when I re-run my regression for H2 (not 
tabulated) with relevance judgment as the predicted variable, I find a non-significant interaction term (p = 0.19 one-
tailed). 
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Table 4: Study 2 Tests of H2 
Panel A: Test of H2 
Appropriateness Judgmentit = β0 + β1Strategy Mapit + β2Causal Relatednessit +  
β3Strategy Map × Causal Relatednessit + Article Summary Fixed Effectsi + ui + εit 
 Coefficient z-value p-value (one-tailed) 
Strategy Map -0.09 -1.20 0.23 
Causal Relatedness 0.02 0.28 0.78 
Strategy Map × Causal 
Relatedness (H2) 0.20 2.03 0.02 
Article Summary  
Fixed Effects — (1,242.23 χ
2) <0.01 
Constant 3.92 28.14 <0.01 
R2 (Appropriateness Judgment): 0.279; Wald χ2 (14) = 1252.66 (p < 0.01) 
 
Panel B: Supplemental Boundary Tests of H2 
 β3Strategy Map × Causal Relatedness (p-value, one-tailed) 
 Below-median subsample (or no business degree) 
Above-median subsample 
(or has business degree) 
Work Experience 0.34 (<0.01) 0.07 (0.30) 
Management Experience 0.12 (0.19) 0.25 (0.03) 
Age 0.27 (0.02) 0.11 (0.20) 
Business degree 0.17 (0.04) 0.31 (0.15) 
Familiarity with Banking 0.48 (<0.01) 0.12 (0.14) 
 
Panel C: Supplemental Simple Effects for H2 
 β1Strategy Map (p-value, one-tailed) 
 Low Causal Relatedness High Causal Relatedness 
Low Work Experience  
( >15 years; n = 161) -0.05 (0.33) 0.30 (<0.01) 
High Management 
Experience ( ≥ 2 years 
n = 186) 






Figure 8: Study 2 Appropriateness Judgment Means 
 
As detailed in Section 4.2.3, I generally expect the H2 effect to be stronger among those 
with low experience. The subsample analysis shown in Table 3 Panel B largely supports this, 
with stronger H2 effects in the below-median subsamples for work experience, age, familiarity 
with banking, and in the subsample for those without a business degree. However, management 
experience has the opposite pattern, in that those with above-median management experience 
appear to have a stronger H2 effect than those with below-median management experience. 
Furthermore, in this regression (not tabulated), strategy map has a significant negative effect (β = 
-0.18, p = 0.04 one-tailed) for those with above-median management experience. This result 
suggests that the H2 effect among the above-median management experience subsample is 
capturing unique downsides to causal linkages that are weak, rather than unique upsides to causal 
linkages that are strong.39 
                                                 
39 Work experience and management experience are correlated but not perfectly: r = 0.50. There are 67 participants 
with above-median management experience and below-median work experience. Under the assumption that the 
effects of work experience and management experience are separable and distinct, I include these participants’ 
responses in my main tests of both subsamples. When I exclude these participants, the negative simple effect for the 
subsample with above-median management experience (and now above-median work experience) remains 
significant (β = -0.24, p = 0.03 one-tailed) while the positive simple effect for the subsample with below-median 
work experience (and now below-median management experience) is only significant at the 90% confidence level (β 
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One possible reason for this result, post hoc, is that management experience provides a 
unique type of background knowledge that increases individuals’ ability to create innovative 
pathways through which the cause could lead to the effect. Those with high experience may 
experience encoding failure because they can think of more pathways for low causal relatedness 
causal linkages. That is, if managers with high experience generate an abundance of possible 
relationships between the cause and the effect for low causal relatedness mini-strategies, this 
could exhaust their working memory capacity and interfere with the process of encoding these 
strategic goals from working memory in long-term memory.  
This tentative explanation fits well with some key prior research. Miller (1956), for 
example, suggests a maximum capacity for items help in working memory at around seven items 
(with some variations depending on item complexity and individual differences, see Prat et al. 
2011). Furthermore, Chang and Birkett (2004) suggest that higher levels of management 
experience are accompanied by increased skills in balancing creativity. If that result is applied to 
this setting, it would be consistent with high management experience accompanying an increased 
ability to think of creative routes that a cause leads to an effect—potentially too many routes to 
hold in working memory when the causal linkage has low causal relatedness. If this is the correct 
explanation for my results among those with above-median management experience, then my 
results suggest it is a phenomenon unique to management experience. My subsample analysis of 
age, work experience, familiarity with banking, and the possession of a business degree do not 
show this pattern. 
This also might explain my failed simple effects analysis. If my H2 effect is a composite 
of two effects—high causal relatedness amplifying causal linkages’ effect on appropriateness 
judgments and low causal relatedness weakening this effect—then splitting these two effects out 
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by causal relatedness condition could weaken the H2 effect such that each condition yields a 
non-significant simple effect (at the 95% confidence level). Panel C of Table 3 is a supplemental 
test that supports this interpretation of my failed simple effects test. In this panel, I re-test for H2 
simple effects among the two subsamples that best represent the two possible effects: those with 
below-median work experience (who best exemplify high causal relatedness amplifying the 
effect of causal linkages) and those with above-median management experience (who best 
exemplify low causal relatedness weakening the effect of causal linkages). I find significant 
simple effects in opposite direction among these two subsamples, suggesting that high causal 
relatedness helps some process causal linkages while low causal relatedness inhibits others from 
processing causal linkages.40 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
A strategy map is a critical component of a balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 
2001b) and is expected to benefit the firm in several ways (e.g. Gimbert et al. 2010; Tayler 2010; 
Kaplan and Norton 2008). Firms expect these benefits to offset the costs of implementing a 
strategy map. One of these benefits is an improvement in managers’ ability to discern the 
relevance of new external information and managers’ ability to determine whether the firm’s 
                                                 
40 An examination of adjusted means for appropriateness judgment in the four experimental conditions of these 
subsamples is directionally consistent with my amplifying and weakening effect explanation (means are adjusted for 
article summary fixed effects). If participants have below-median work experience, appropriateness judgment means 
for those who receive a non-causal list are 3.53 and 3.54 for low and high causal relatedness conditions, 
respectively. But those who receive a strategy map have appropriateness judgment means of 3.41 in the low causal 
relatedness condition and 3.71 in the high causal relatedness condition. If participants have above-median 
management experience, appropriateness judgment means of those who receive a non-causal list are 3.63 and 3.59 
for low and high causal relatedness conditions, respectively. But those who receive a strategy map have a mean of 
3.38 in the low causal relatedness condition and a mean of 3.43 in the high causal relatedness condition. 
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strategy is appropriate given this new information (Cheng and Humphreys 2012). However, it is 
unclear from prior research if this benefit of a strategy map depends on strong causal linkages.  
In this study, I conduct an experiment that tests how causal linkage strength, i.e. causal 
relatedness, impacts the effect of a strategy map on relevance and appropriateness judgements. 
First, I find evidence that receiving a strategy map improves relevance judgments, a finding in 
line with prior literature. This allows managers to better determine the relevance of new 
information by testing if that information belongs to the same category as the firm’s strategic 
goals. This finding is still worth replicating because it uses a different sample, a different 
scenario, and a different set of goals that make up a strategy map.  
I do not find evidence that receiving a strategy map’s causal linkages alone improve 
appropriateness judgments. However, I do find evidence that when causal linkages connect high 
causal relatedness goals, the result is better appropriateness judgments. Together, these results 
enrich the knowledge of researchers who examine the judgment and decision making effects of a 
strategy map as well as the knowledge of practitioners who hope to successfully implement a 
strategy map. Specifically, these findings suggest practitioners can maximize the beneficial 
appropriateness judgment of a strategy map by ensuring its causal-linkages are strong. 
One limitation of this study is the time constraint I place on how participants encode the 
firm’s strategic goals in long-term memory. It is possible that if participants were given more 
time they could commit low causal relatedness goals to memory, thereby diminishing any 
differences in appropriateness judgments between this condition and the high causal relatedness 
condition. However, even if this were the case, the practical implications of this study would 
largely remain the same. My results still suggest that firms are best off with strong causal 
linkages, i.e. causal relationships with high causal relatedness, thus maximizing the benefit 
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obtained from a strategy map’s causal linkages. Managers’ time is scarce, and if causal linkages 
with low causal relatedness strategic goals require extra time to commit to memory, that in and 
of itself would make a strategy map less beneficial to the firm.  
This study is also limited to examining the effect of receiving a strategy map in isolation. 
Strategy maps are components of a balanced scorecard framework that includes performance 
measures in each of the balanced scorecard categories. Also, balanced scorecard frameworks are 
usually distributed within the firm by way of regular meetings and substantial training during the 
development and rollout stages, as well as regular follow-up meetings (Kaplan and Norton 
2008). While my study lacks these other contextual features that typically accompany a strategy 
map, I do this purposefully. Prior research has suggested that receiving a strategy map has a 
differential effect apart from its contextual trappings within the larger balanced scorecard (Cheng 
and Humphreys 2012). This study follows in that vein by stripping away the context of a strategy 
map and looking at the incremental effect of this particularly visible component of a balanced 
scorecard. Also, by limiting these contextual features, I can better control the laboratory 
environment and better ensure my statistical inferences actually do relate to the constructs 
associated with strategy maps, rather than being driven by something else in the balanced 
scorecard framework. I acknowledge, though, that this experimental design choice differs, in 
large part, from the way decision makers encounter a strategy map in practice. It is entirely 
possible that some contextual features of a balanced scorecard suppress, overwhelm, or interact 
with the effects found in this study. 
Given this latter limitation, one potential extension of this study would be to examine the 
effect of receiving causal linkages with high causal relatedness and low causal relatedness within 
a more robust and complete balanced scorecard context. Prior research shows that when 
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performance measures are strategically-linked (meaning that they line up with the strategic goals 
in a strategy map), managers pay more attention to them (Banker et al. 2004). Similarly, it is 
possible that the causal relatedness effect observed in this study extends to the performance 
measures that are linked to the strategic goals in a strategy map. Managers may differentially 
attend to performance measures linked to strategic goals with high causal relatedness over 












5.0  PROPOSED NEUROIMAGING EXTENSIONS 
5.1 HOW DO SUBORDINATES REACT TO MIDDLE MANAGERS’ IMPRESSION 
MANAGEMENT?  
Impression management describes one person’s attempts to influence another person’s 
impression of him or her. In Study 1, I find that middle managers make decisions about what 
information to pass along to upper management based on whether they think upper management 
will be impressed by that information—that is, based on impression management. I then find that 
middle managers’ impression management also affects their evaluation of the subordinates who 
provide information to middle managers. Middle managers more positively evaluate the 
performance of subordinates who provide information that middle managers think will impress 
upper management than subordinates who provide information that middle managers think will 
not impress upper management. 
In Study 1, I predict from these findings that long-term subordinate preferences for 
information will change because of this bias in middle managers’ evaluations. Subordinates will 
learn the evaluative consequences of providing different types of information to middle 
managers and will preferentially seek out and pass along information that is perceived to impress 
upper management (see also Bol 2008). Effectively, my Study 1 prediction could arise for two 
reasons. First, subordinates may become biased toward passing along impressive information 
simply because they learn that middle managers are most likely to reward this type of feedback. 
If this holds true, subordinates with biased middle managers still likely view unimpressive 
information as valuable, but know not to bring it up with middle managers.  
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The second reason for subordinates to differentially pass along impressive information is 
that subordinates internalize middle managers’ impression management and come to believe that 
unimpressive information is by itself less valuable. In this case, subordinates effectively 
engaging in impression management of upper management by proxy, even though upper 
management does not directly affect these subordinates’ compensation. The second reason for 
this phenomenon would have far wider implications than the first, suggesting subordinates might 
undervalue unimpressive information in a vast array of different choices they make.  
My proposed extension of Study 1 is a neuroimaging study that tests how much 
subordinates have internalized middle managers’ impression management-based biases. Rather 
than behaviorally test a long list of contextual decisions subordinates need to make that might be 
affected by a devaluation of unimpressive information, imaging allows me to examine the degree 
to which subordinates’ immediate brain activation in response to unimpressive information 
matches with them engaging in impression management themselves.  
To test this, I assign all participants to act as a subordinate who decides whether to pass 
along information that they discover. However, these participants are divided into two 
conditions: one in which they receive middle manager evaluations that are biased against 
unimpressive information and one in which middle managers are not biased against unimpressive 
information. By using a prearranged set of middle manager responses, rather than actual 
participants playing the role of middle managers, this design avoids the costly imprecision that 
real participants often present. Real participants acting as middle managers are likely to be 
inconsistent in their decisions about rewarding or punishing subordinates and subordinate 
learning of these preferences might take a long time (using up costly minutes in an MRI 
scanner). 
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To analyze these results, I compare neural activation across the three types of stimuli: 
impressive information, unimpressive information, and neutral information that is neither 
impressive nor unimpressive.41 I expect to find that, over time, subordinates’ brain activation 
will become biased towards impressive information over unimpressive information when the 
middle manager is biased. I expect two patterns of brain activation to emerge among 
subordinates with biased middle managers. First, I expect the subordinates’ neural activation 
pattern in those areas associated with impression management (see Farrow et al. 2015; Schilbach 
et al. 2006) are stronger when they receive impressive information than when they receive 
unimpressive information.42 Second, I expect that brain regions more generally associated with 
anticipating reward (see Knutson et al. 2001) will activate more strongly when they decide to 
pass along impressive information than when they pass along unimpressive information.  
Importantly, I compare activation in response to the three types of stimuli with the brain 
regions associated with anticipating future rewards and impression management for each 
individual. To locate these brain regions, I conduct two localizer tasks in which participants 
perform tasks identifying the brain regions that activate when participants anticipate future 
rewards and consider impression management implications. The first localizer task is patterned 
after the task used by Knutson et al. (2001), in which participants respond to different levels of 
anticipated reward. The regions identified in this task indicate an activation pattern for 
anticipating reward. The second localizer task is patterned after the experiment performed by 
                                                 
41 The neutral information condition is useful for developing appropriate contrasts in neural activation between 
conditions. Neural activation needs to be compared to a baseline, and using impressive or unimpressive information 
as a baseline would be inadequate for discerning if the hypothesized effect is from subordinates reacting positively 
to impressive information or negatively to unimpressive information. 
42 Alternatively, the neural activation pattern could be U-shaped, with impressive and unimpressive information 
requiring impression management extensive processing with neutral information requiring little. Given limited 
literature on the predicted shape of the neural response to this kind of stimuli, I plan to test both plausible patterns. 
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Farrow et al. (2015). In this task, participants are shown questions about themselves and alternate 
between instructions to answer the questions so as to give the best impression of themselves (the 
impression management condition) and instructions to count how many letters are in the 
questions (the counting condition, i.e., a control condition). By comparing activation in this 
localizer task, I can locate the brain regions that activate when participants are engaging in 
impression management to make a good impression on others. 
In this study, I provide important evidence about how subordinates react to biased middle 
managers. This is an important extension of Study 1. This study provides evidence of whether 
subordinates react to these middle managers by biasing one judgment or by mirroring middle 
managers’ bias in a more pervasive and widespread manner to affect other judgments as well.  
5.2 DIFFERENTIAL BRAIN ACTIVATION FROM A STRATEGY MAP 
A relevance judgment is a manager’s judgment of how relevant a piece of new information is to 
the task of evaluating the firm’s strategy. Managers make this critical judgment as they work to 
continuously revise the firm’s strategy to address new developments and previously unknown 
trends. In Study 2, I find that the causal linkages of a strategy map improve relevance judgments. 
That is, when managers learn the firm’s strategic goals and causal linkages have been placed 
between these goals, they more accurately determine whether new information is relevant to the 
firm’s strategy. I theorize that this is because causal linkages improve managers’ recall of the 
firm’s strategic goals from long-term memory, thus making it easier to recall those strategic 
goals and compare them with the new information. 
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In Study 2, however, I do not directly measure participants’ recall of the firm’s strategic 
goals in long-term memory. In this proposed study, I use neuroimaging techniques to extend 
Study 2 to test whether these goals are better recalled and why they are better recalled. In short, I 
test whether receiving a strategy map leads to sharper contrasts between the brain activation 
patterns for each goal, which is my proxy for improved recall of the firm’s strategic goals.43 To 
test this, I partially replicate the work of Just et al. (2010). They analyze the brain activation 
patterns produced by 60 concrete nouns and train a machine learning classifier algorithm on 
these activation patterns. Then the classifier is tested by whether it can predict which noun is 
represented in brain activation patterns that the algorithm has not previously seen. This classifier 
uses an approach called multi-voxel pattern analysis, which tests patterns of brain activation 
across a population of voxels rather than just comparing activation in one voxel at a time (see 
Coutanche 2013 for a description and review of this method).44 Just et al. find that the algorithm 
can predict, with a relatively high level of accuracy, which word is being thought of by using the 
brain activation pattern. In effect, the classifier can read the mind of the participant. Importantly, 
they find that the more distinct the words being tested, the higher the accuracy of the classifier. 
I expect strategic goals to function in the same way. Strategic goals and concrete nouns 
should both have recognizable brain activation patterns specific to each goal or noun. Concrete 
nouns have the advantage of being associated with some physical experience, which leads to 
                                                 
43 Although it is possible to measure recall of the firm’s strategic goals using a behavioral experiment without 
neuroimaging techniques, using neuroimaging allows me to provide a more complete answer of how a strategy map 
affects recall. That is, the paragraphs below explain how a classifier is used to test whether brain regions associated 
with the four categories are apt for discriminating between strategic goals. Thus, this proposed study not only tests 
whether the firm’s strategic goals are better recalled, but also whether this improvement occurs in the way theorized 
by strategy map theory. 
44 A voxel is a unit of measurement of three-dimensional space in the brain used in fMRI studies to pinpoint brain 
activation. A voxel is typically the smallest unit of measurement available and varies in absolute size based on the 
resolution of the scan performed. Voxels are the three-dimensional analog to two-dimensional pixels. 
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unique and distinguishable locations for activation. For example, Just et al. (2010) find that 
concrete nouns that are interpreted as tools tend to be associated with brain areas that are 
involved with motor control, almost as if the meaning is tied up in simulating hefting the tool. 
However, strategy maps may still produce a recognizable brain activation pattern because, by 
design, they span four distinct categories of strategic goals: learning and growth, internal 
processes, customer, and financial goals. Managers with adequate experience will likely have 
unique experiences with these categories of strategic goals, leading to differentiable brain 
regions that activate when exposed to goals in these respective categories.  
The brain activation patterns for better recalled strategic goals should be more distinct, 
making the classifier more accurate. By replicating the procedures of Just et al. (2010)—using 
the firm’s strategic goals in place of concrete nouns—I train two separate classifiers on two 
separate groups of participants: participants who receive the firm’s strategic goals with causal 
linkages and participants who receive the same strategic goals without causal linkages. The task 
participants complete, which produces the brain activation for the classifier algorithm, is a two-
step learning and recognition task. Outside the scanner, participants learn the firm’s strategic 
goals. Then, inside the scanner, participants complete a recognition task. The recognition task is 
a series of multiple choice questions. Participants are shown several foil goals (designed to look 
like the actual firm strategic goals) and one actual firm strategic goal. They attempt to select the 
actual strategic goal presented to them. This task is repeated in the scanner several times.  
Participants also complete a localizer task in the scanner. This task helps identify brain 
regions that activate among individual participants. The task involves evaluating several chains 
of strategic goals passing through each of the four balanced scorecard categories. This task 
provides evidence of the brain regions that activate when thinking about these four categories. 
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Then when I train the classifiers on activation patterns during the recognition task I can focus on 
brain regions specified in the localizer task. Based on my theory from Study 2, I expect the 
classifier that is trained on participants that receive the firm’s strategic goals with causal linkages 
will have greater accuracy than the classifier trained on participants who receive the firm’s 
strategic goals without causal linkages. This would provide direct evidence that causal linkages 
do indeed lead to better recall of strategic goals in long-term memory, confirming a key assertion 
of Study 2. 
5.3 A NEUROIMAGING INVESTIGATION OF WHY COMMUNICATING CAUSAL 
LINKAGES IMPROVES WORKERS’ EFFORT ALLOCATIONS 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Agents in a firm have limited effort to allocate among a nearly-infinite array of possible 
activities. Unfortunately, agents often allocate their effort between activities in a suboptimal 
way, favoring activities that more directly impact the agent’s financial outcome and activities 
with more immediate rewards (e.g. Chen et al. 2015; Hannan et al. 2012; Farrell et al. 2012; 
Laverty 1996; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Farrell et al. (2012) find that communicating the 
cause-and-effect relationship between non-financial quality activities in the short-term and long-
term financial rewards leads to agents better allocating their time between activities. This finding 
has significant implications for practice, including the implication that firms could find it 
beneficial to implement a strategy map. A strategy map is a formal visual depiction of 
hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships between leading non-financial goals and lagging 
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financial goals. For the remainder of this proposal, I use the term causal linkage to mean cause-
and-effect relationships, whether visually communicated in a strategy map or otherwise. 
However, practitioners may not have as much confidence from Farrell et al.’s (2012) 
findings as they need in order to decide if implementing a strategy map is beneficial to the firm. 
There are two possible explanations for why agents who learn of causal linkages better allocate 
effort than those who do not. These two explanations, detailed below, differ in terms of how long 
the effect is likely to last, which impacts decision makers significantly. If this effect dissipates 
quickly, then it is unlikely that a strategy map substantially benefits the firm through improved 
effort allocations. Thus, it is less likely to be worth implementing a strategy map. If, instead, the 
effect persists over the long-term, then it is more likely that a strategy map substantially benefits 
the firm through improved effort allocations. Thus, it is more likely to be worth implementing a 
strategy map. 
The first explanation for why communicating causal linkages improves workers’ effort 
allocations is that poor effort allocations from workers who do not learn of causal linkages are 
driven by an irrational and distorted view of utility over time that favors short-term rewards. This 
is also called hyperbolic discounting because it involves inappropriate discounting of the present 
value of future rewards, often approximated by a hyperbolic function (e.g. Epper et al. 2011; 
Laibson 1997). Hyperbolic discounting theory suggests that many agents suffer from a deep and 
systematic preference of short-term rewards over long-term rewards. Based on this theory, 
receiving information on a causal linkage might only temporarily increase the salience of long-
term rewards, leading to better effort allocation only in the short-term. Once that salience has 
dissipated, agents should return to their prior suboptimal effort allocation. This explanation 
suggests that a strategy map’s effect on agents’ effort allocations could be short-lived. If this 
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explanation is accurate, a strategy map is unlikely to improve workers’ effort allocations for 
long, thus suggesting a strategy map is less beneficial to the firm.45 
In contrast, the second explanation for causal linkages affecting workers’ effort 
allocations is that poor effort allocations in the absence of causal linkages are due to the overuse 
of model-free reinforcement learning on the part of agents. Model-free reinforcement learning is 
one of two complementary systems in the brain—the other system being model-based 
reinforcement learning—that together help one learn and optimize future actions. Model-free 
reinforcement learning is merely trial-and-error learning in which one does not develop any 
theory for why a certain outcome is obtains from a certain alternative, but merely notes that it did 
obtain from a certain alternative. Model-based reinforcement learning, in contrast, is guided 
learning based on a theory for events—or a “model”—that attempts to predict the future beyond 
what has been observed in the past. It is also cognitively costly. Most learning is a combination 
of these two, but an overuse of model-free reinforcement learning can lead to an agent ignoring 
even obvious interdependencies and interconnections between activities, instead focusing on the 
average outcome previously observed from each alternative (Herrnstein and Prelec 1991). This 
explanation of Farrell et al.’s (2012) results would suggest that the causal linkage communicated 
to agents serves as a model that allows agents otherwise prone to overusing model-free 
reinforcement learning to more appropriately balance that form of reinforcement learning with 
model-based reinforcement learning. Furthermore, this explanation suggests that a strategy 
map’s effect on agents’ effort allocations might be long-lasting. If this explanation is accurate, a 
                                                 
45 Or, alternatively, this result could simply mean that to maintain the strategy map benefit of improvements in effort 
allocation over time, managers need to regularly continuously remind workers of causal linkages to keep these 
connections salient to workers. Regardless, this finding would suggest an additional cost to implementing a strategy 
map: continuous reminders. 
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strategy map is likely to improve workers’ effort allocations for an extended period, thus 
suggesting a strategy map is more beneficial to the firm. 
My study seeks to disentangle these two explanations for why communicating causal 
linkages improves agents’ effort allocations. By using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(hereafter referred to as fMRI), I record agents’ brain activation while they perform a task like 
that used by Farrell et al. (2012). Then I compare this pattern of brain activation to agent’s brain 
activation on tasks previously used to study hyperbolic discounting (Ballard and Knutson 2009; 
see also Kable and Glimcher 2007) and model-free/model-based reinforcement learning 
(Gläscher et al. 2010; see also Schönberg et al. 2007). In so doing, I provide evidence of agents’ 
neural processing (and thus, thought patterns) during task completion, providing practitioners 
with important evidence about the persistence of a strategy map’s effect on effort allocation and 
helping them decide whether implementing a strategy map is beneficial to the firm. 
In the abstract, I define strategy revision judgments as manager judgments that affect how 
well the firm can revise its strategy when new information comes to light. This study does not 
directly test how a strategy map affects how managers make these judgments. Rather, the results 
of this study provide managers with information about strategy maps that could prompt a 
manager to revise the firm’s strategy to include a strategy map or to eliminate a strategy map. 
This differs from the tack taken in my first two studies. My first study, in Section 3, examines 
how a strategy map affects information sharing within a firm, thus affecting the information 
available for use to revise the firm’s strategy. My second study, in Section 4, examines how a 
strategy map affects managers’ judgments about the relevance of new information and the 
appropriateness of the firm’s strategy, judgments that precede appropriately using new 
information to revise the firm’s strategy.  
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Together these two studies fit well with the idea of examining a strategy map’s effect on 
the how managers consider information when revising the firm’s strategy, either by altering how 
middle managers’ share information to upper management when that information is relevant to 
strategy revision or by affecting how managers process new information that is relevant to 
strategy revision when they receive it. The results of this study, in contrast, examine one way a 
strategy map could be the information managers consider when revising the firm’s strategy. The 
results of this study could easily be an article summary presented to managers in Study 2. Thus, 
this study joins a stream of prior studies that examine the broader benefits or costs of a strategy 
map that could affect its attractiveness to firms (e.g. Farrell et al. 2012; Mastilak et al. 2012; 
Banker et al. 2011; Banker et al. 2004).46 
5.3.2 Hypothesis Development 
5.3.2.1 Causal Linkages’ Effect on Workers’ Effort Allocations 
Farrell et al. (2012) conduct an important experiment, in which participants perform the 
same task over several rounds. The quality of the participant’s output in one round affects the 
price per unit of his or her output in the next round. This is the causal linkage of interest to their 
study. Thus, in each round participants choose between short-term focused activities, which yield 
short-term rewards (i.e. creating as many units of output as possible), and long-term focused 
activities, which yield long-term rewards (i.e. maintaining high quality output so as to raise the 
price in the next round). Farrell et al. manipulate how much communication participants receive 
                                                 
46 Contrast these studies against those examining the principal studies prompting my first and second studies (Cheng 
and Humphreys 2012; Tayler 2010), which focus on the effect of a strategy map on how managers make strategy 
revision judgments. 
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about this causal linkage. In one condition, a control condition, the participants are merely told 
that prices can change from round to round. In a second condition, the qualitative condition, 
participants learn that higher quality output in one round will raise the price per unit of output in 
the next round, but participants do not know the numerical value of this relationship. In the last 
condition, the quantitative condition, participants are given a detailed description of the exact 
numerical relationship between quality in one round and prices in the next round. 
In the control condition, the researchers find that some participants learn about the causal 
linkage on their own, but about thirty percent fail to produce high quality output that raises the 
next period’s price—suggesting this group ignores the causal linkage between current-period 
quality and future-period price. In the second condition, where the causal linkage is 
communicated but not quantified, the researchers find that participants’ allocation of effort 
between quality and quantity of output significantly improves. In the final condition, in which 
numerical information about the causal linkage is communicated, they find little improvement 
upon the results from the second condition. Together these findings suggest that communicating 
causal linkage between long-term focused activities in the current period and long-term rewards 
improves workers’ effort allocation. 
This finding has significant implications for firms considering a strategy map. Strategy 
maps visually depict hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships between leading non-financial 
goals and lagging financial goals. A strategy map can be interpreted as a large-scale 
implementation of the qualitative causal linkage Farrell et al. (2012) communicate to participants 
in the second condition of their experiment. However, it is still unclear from their findings how 
long this effect will persist, because the researchers provide limited evidence as to why 
participants better allocate their effort when causal linkages are communicated.  
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5.3.2.2 Hyperbolic discounting 
A broad spectrum of literature suggests agents in a firm often allocate effort between 
long-term focused and short-term focused activities in a way that is suboptimal to the firm (e.g. 
Chen et al. 2015; Hannan et al. 2012; Farrell et al. 2012; Laverty 1996; Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991). This suboptimal allocation is consistent with two separate theories about intertemporal 
choice, that is, choices that agents make over time. In this section, I examine an economics 
theory for deficiencies in intertemporal choice, while in section 5.3.2.2, I examine a psychology 
and neuroscience theory for deficiencies in intertemporal choice. Prior research in economics 
shows that individuals often prefer immediate rewards over financially equivalent future 
rewards. This is sometimes called hyperbolic discounting because of the shape of the preference 
function often observed in these irrational intertemporal preferences.47  
In order to compare future rewards and immediate rewards, individuals must discount 
future rewards based on their desired rate of return over time. That is, if alternative #1 is to take 
$1.00 today and alternative #2 is to take $1.25 next year, one cannot choose between the two 
without having an expectation of how much one expects to earn from $1.00 over the course of a 
year, i.e. his or her desired rate of return. If one’s desired rate of return were more than 25%, 
taking the dollar immediately would be the better choice because in a year’s time it would be 
worth more than $1.25.48 Better put, the present value of $1.25 in a year, which is the amount of 
money in the present that is expected to grow into $1.25 in a year’s time, is less than the present 
                                                 
47 Technically, the following paragraphs lay out the mathematical approximation known as quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting (Laibson 1997; originally developed by Phelps and Pollak 1968). This approximation of hyperbolic 
discounting provides largely the same predictions and is easier to manage mathematically. 
48 This assumes that risks are factored into one’s desired rate of return. 
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value of $1.00. Discounting future rewards to their present value is an obligatory component of 
almost all business calculations.  
In contrast, some research has found that human behavior is characterized by an irrational 
preference for immediate rewards over future rewards. Laibson (1997) approximates hyperbolic 
discounting in a utility function similar to the following.  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 × 𝛿𝛿(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1) 
The 𝛿𝛿(∙) term represents a discounting function that appropriately discounts the utility of 
future rewards (i.e. 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1). The 𝛽𝛽 term is between 0 and 1 and represents the irrational 
discounting of future rewards. Thus, returning to my example above, I assume that one’s rate of 
return is less than 25%, meaning the 𝛿𝛿(∙) function would render utility of alternative #2 to be 
greater than the utility of alternative #1. A rational individual in this case would choose 
alternative #2. But the 𝛽𝛽 term can discount this future reward, making the future reward less 
attractive and making one opt for alternative #1 at time t = 1. The smaller the 𝛽𝛽 term the greater 
the preference for immediate rewards. Interestingly, at time t = 0, the 𝛽𝛽 term has no effect on 
one’s preference between the two alternatives, because both $1 (in the future) and $1.25 (further 
in the future) are discounted by the same amount: 𝛽𝛽. Thus, at t = 0 one could plan on choosing 
alternative #2, the more long-term oriented alternative with higher overall utility. Then, at t =1, 
one would suddenly find it less attractive to wait for the $1.25 (which has been discounted by the 
𝛽𝛽 term, while the $1.00 is no longer discounted by the 𝛽𝛽 term). Then one changes course and 
takes the immediate $1.00, instead of following through with the original plan to select the 
higher utility, long-term oriented alternative. 
One everyday example of this very pattern is the tradition of new year’s resolutions, 
which often begin well-intentioned and spirited, but typically fail over time. Wiseman (2008) 
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reports that new year’s resolutions have a success rate of about 12%, a poor rate of success that 
appears to be consistent with hyperbolic discounting. That is, on New Year’s Day, i.e. t = 0, the 
resolution appears to be achievable, with the future costs of the resolution being at least equal to 
the benefits over the long-term. As the year progresses, i.e. at t > 0, the utility of future rewards 
decrease by a factor of 𝛽𝛽 relative to the disutility of now-present costs, often leading to the 
abandonment of the resolution. 
The fact that hyperbolic discounting is observed so widely suggests that the 𝛽𝛽 term is a 
stubborn feature of one’s utility function and is difficult to change (see O'Donoghue and Rabin 
1999). However, I expect that it is possible for an emphasis on causal linkages between short-
term costs and long-term rewards can offset 𝛽𝛽 for a short time. Returning to the new year’s 
resolution example, there is often a short time during which temporary excitement for the new 
commitment increases the salience of the long-term rewards. The increased salience of future 
period rewards effectively increases 𝛽𝛽. In the below equation, I represent this by replacing 𝛽𝛽 
with a function, 𝜎𝜎(𝛽𝛽, 𝑡𝑡∗), with 𝑡𝑡∗ representing a temporary increase in 𝛽𝛽 in period 𝑡𝑡∗. 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝛽𝛽, 𝑡𝑡∗)× 𝛿𝛿(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1) 
Using this explanation of Farrell et al.’s (2012) findings, the effect of communicating 
causal linkages to workers is relatively temporary. Once period 𝑡𝑡∗ passes, 𝛽𝛽 returns to standard 
rates and irrational hyperbolic discounting continues unabated. Using this interpretation, when 
Farrell et al. communicate causal linkages to participants, it positively affects participants only in 
time 𝑡𝑡∗, which lasts throughout their experiment. Based on this interpretation, sometime after the 
length of time it takes for participants to complete their experiment, the salience of the long-term 
rewards should fade and short-term rewards would look more and more attractive in comparison. 
Thus, suboptimal discounting would return. This interpretation suggests that a strategy map, 
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which is costly to implement and maintain, does not have a sustainable beneficial effect on 
workers’ effort allocations. I capture this interpretation in my first hypothesis. 
H1: When a firm communicates to workers that causal linkages exist between long-term 
focused activities in the current period and long-term reward, this improves their effort 
allocation between long-term focused activities and short-term focused activities in the 
current period by temporarily disrupting workers’ hyperbolic discounting. 
5.3.2.3 Model-free and Model-based Reinforcement Learning 
Intertemporal choice is affected by what individuals predict to arise from different 
alternatives, and cognitive inefficiencies in these predictions could explain Farrell et al.’s (2012) 
findings. Psychology and neuroscience theory suggest that individuals adjust their predictions of 
the future over time using two complementary systems in the brain: model-free reinforcement 
learning and model-based reinforcement learning. Model-free reinforcement learning simply 
tracks average prior outcomes from different alternatives, producing a likely outcome number for 
each of the available alternatives. This is a useful tool that helps humans learn most skills. For 
example, it is useful in learning how to shoot a basketball. The practice involved in developing 
expertise in basketball provides the brain with millions of data points for determining which 
muscles to use and when to use them to make a basket. The analysis of these many data points 
would be the role of model-free reinforcement learning. 
Model-based reinforcement learning, in contrast, requires one to develop a declarative 
theory for cause and effect to better predict the expected outcome. Model-based reinforcement 
learning serves to economize the trial-and-error approach of model-free reinforcement learning; 
one can rule out certain activities and focus on other activities based on the model, without the 
need for extensive practice at these activities first. Continuing with my basketball example, the 
benefits of practice are amplified when a coach provides examples of good form for shooting a 
basketball. The coach’s example is a model that provides a theoretical basis for predicting what 
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muscle movements and timing are likely or unlikely to make a basket, above and beyond one’s 
own observations from his or her own practice. This form of reinforcement learning is more 
cognitively costly because one must create and interpret a model, then extrapolate the 
implications of this model for one’s choice of alternatives.  
Typically, model-free and model-based systems work together. However, sometimes one 
system is overused (see Herrnstein and Prelec 1991). If a model is unavailable or difficult to 
form, model-free reinforcement learning can be overused and lead to suboptimal decisions. For 
example, it can be difficult to discern interrelationships between different alternatives over time, 
if one only judges from past experience without creating a model from that experience. For 
example, assume there are two alternative basketball shots: a jump shot and a layup.49 A layup, 
on average, is effective 50% of the time and a jump shot, on average, is effective 25% of the 
time. An offensive player using model-free reinforcement learning can detect these averages 
over time, leading such a player to favor layups over jump shots.  
However, what is missing from this example is that once defenders have been bested by a 
layup, they begin to anticipate the next layup and change their defensive tactics to block it more 
effectively. Thus, a layup that follows another layup is somewhat less effective. A layup that 
follows two consecutive layups is even less effective and so forth. As defenders alter tactics to 
better block layups, they make it relatively easier for the offensive player to successfully 
complete a jump shot. This cause-and-effect relationship between alternatives is a model because 
it predicts the rates of success in the next round without necessarily relying on past experience 
with these alternatives. Model-free reinforcement learning is ill-equipped for altering the success 
rate of different alternatives based on unexperienced context. Based on this cause-and-effect 
                                                 
49 This example is inspired by an example relayed by Farrell et al. (2012). 
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relationship between alternatives, i.e. based on this model, the optimal strategy is to pursue a 
mixture of layups and jump shots that includes far more jump shots than suggested by the 
original success rates (the exact mixture depending on how quickly defenders adapt to layups). 
However, without a model for how a layup attempted in this round affects the probable outcomes 
for next round, the offensive player will forego this strategy in favor of a far more layup-heavy 
strategy based on a 50% layup success rate versus 25% jump shot success rate. Thus, an overuse 
of model-free reinforcement learning can lead to suboptimal outcomes because it ignores 
interrelationships between alternatives over time. 
Effectively, Farrell et al.’s (2012) findings can be explained as an overuse of model-free 
reinforcement learning. Based on this explanation, communicating causal linkages provides a 
model so workers can use a model-based approach to effort allocations. Alternatively, relying on 
model-free learning leads some workers to overuse that system and suboptimally allocate effort. 
I have no theoretical basis for expecting the positive effect of having a cause-and-effect model to 
diminish over time. This leads to my second hypothesis. 
H2: When a firm communicates to workers that causal linkages exist between long-term 
focused activities in the current period and long-term reward, this improves their effort 
allocation between long-term focused activities and short-term focused activities in the 
current period by communicating a model to facilitate model-based reinforcement 
learning. 
5.3.2.4 Measuring Neural Activation 
Prior research shows brain activation in differentiable brain regions for both hyperbolic 
discounting (Ballard and Knutson 2009; see also Kable and Glimcher 2007) and model-
free/model-based reinforcement learning (Gläscher et al. 2010; see also Schönberg et al. 2007). 
This prior research is important because it suggests that one should be able to identify neural 
activation, and thus thought processes, that are consistent with these explanations. By examining 
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the neural activation that accompanies workers’ effort allocation decisions, I can provide 
evidence as to which of my two above hypotheses is correct. Measuring neural activation also 
avoids difficulties associated with participants lacking self-knowledge of their thought 
processes.50  
Activation of a neuron, i.e. neuronal activation, refers to the signal sent by one neuron to 
another, which is the fundamental phenomenon underlying cognitive activity in the brain. 
Typically, the activation of individual neurons, or even the activation of small groups of neurons, 
is not directly measured in human brain research. Directly measuring this activation would 
involve the surgical application of probes, which is extremely invasive and results in some 
degree of permanent damage, raising many technical, medical, and ethical concerns. Instead, 
brain activity is often measured by close proxies for neuronal activation. These proxies typically 
capture activation on a much larger scale than the individual neuron, instead representing whole 
regions of the brain, which are often made up of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or 
millions of neurons. 
In the case of fMRI, the close proxy for neuronal activation is the blood-oxygen levels in 
different regions of the brain, which correspond to intensive neuronal activation in those regions. 
Blood-oxygen levels correspond to neuronal activation because oxygenated blood provides 
trophic support for activated neurons, given that neuronal activation depletes important blood-
borne resources in the neuron. When a brain region undergoes intensive activation, oxygenated 
blood re-routes toward this activated brain region to resupply that region and this change within 
the brain can be detected by measuring the magnetic resonance of brain regions in response to a 
                                                 
50 I do not review the brain regions specified by these studies in this section because my method involves localizer 
tasks that capture each participant’s unique pattern of brain region activation during the tasks. 
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magnetic pulse that originates outside the brain (see Ogawa et al. 1990). Magnetic resonance 
responses generate a contrast between oxygenated blood levels in different regions of the brain.51 
Thus, the signal being tracked is often called blood-oxygen level dependent contrast, or BOLD 
contrast. In the case of this proposed study, I expect this BOLD contrast to support either H1 or 
H2.  
5.3.3 Method 
5.3.3.1 Experimental Design 
To replicate the results from Farrell et al.’s (2012) study that are most relevant to my 
research question, I employ a 1 × 2 experimental design with one between-subject manipulation. 
This between-subject manipulation is the qualitative communication of a causal linkage, and it is 
manipulated at two-levels: causal linkage and no causal linkage. As described below, the 
experimental task is also derived from Farrell et al. In the causal linkage condition, I 
communicate to participants that quality in one period affects output price in future periods. In 
the no causal linkage condition, I simply inform participants that output price may change in 
future periods. 
For simplicity, I omit Farrell et al.’s (2012) condition in which they provide a quantitative 
substantiation of the causal linkage because their results suggest the quantitative communication 
of causal linkages provides little improvement in effort allocations above communication of 
qualitative cause-and effect relationships. Both of my experimental conditions complete the same 
                                                 
51 Magnetic resonance imaging generates an image from different regions within the scanning field, i.e. different 
regions of brain tissue, based on their response to a magnetic pulse. By repeating this magnetic pulse over and over 
in quick succession, fMRI can provide real-time depictions of changes in blood-oxygen level from different stimuli. 
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experimental procedures described below. Also, I expect that endogenous groupings of 
participants into learning and non-learning types, as observed by Farrell et al. This is because 
some participants likely tend toward completing tasks through an overuse of model-free 
reinforcement learning. These groupings are endogenous however, and do not reflect an 
experimental manipulation. 
One key problem with BOLD contrasts is that they tend to be statistically noisy. There 
are several reasons for this and intensive statistical pre-processing techniques have been 
developed to remove as much of the noise as possible and extract the underlying signal. Other 
pre-processing techniques are useful for communicating studies to other researchers, but these 
can remove some of the richness of the data and can actually make BOLD signals harder to find. 
One such pre-processing technique is normalization of the brain to a standard map of the brain 
across participants. Everyone’s brain is wired differently and brain regions vary slightly as to 
where they are, what they look like, and how much they activate given a stimulus. Normalization 
removes some of the idiosyncrasies of individual brains and overlays each participants’ brain 
activation onto a standardized map of the brain that can be readily communicated to other 
researchers. When comparisons across conditions are completed after normalization, after the 
unique patterns of each brain are stripped away, tests for significant differences rely on whether 
brain activation patterns align across individuals.  
Instead, I use localizer tasks to enhance an otherwise noisy BOLD contrast, which can 
utilize idiosyncratic information prior to normalization. Localizer tasks serve as baseline 
comparisons that identify the brain regions that activate uniquely for each individual 
participant’s brain as they complete a task known to engage certain types of thought processes. 
Rather than compare groups of participants in my two experimental conditions against each 
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other—a comparison that would take place after the normalization process where idiosyncratic 
differences are lost—I compare participants’ activation pattern in Farrell et al.’s (2012) task 
against their own activation patterns during localizer tasks. This increases the statistical power of 
my analysis. These localizer tasks, described below, are patterned after prior tasks used to 
research hyperbolic discounting and model-free/model-based reinforcement learning. 
5.3.3.2 Participants 
Participants are drawn from a pool like that used by Farrell et al. (2012): undergraduates 
enrolled in upper-division accounting courses. This participant pool has several advantages. 
First, this pool matches Farrell et al.’s, a fact that limits potential confounds that otherwise could 
interfere with interpreting my results in light of theirs. Second, this participant pool is readily 
available and relatively easy to schedule in the MRI scanner. This is important because only one 
participant can be in the scanner at a time and if participants are hard to schedule, it may take an 
excessive period of time to collect the MRI data. Third, I expect this group to have significant 
background knowledge due to their advanced position in their respective degree programs. This 
background knowledge means they can complete the task using thought processes close to those 
used in practice. I pay participants a competitive flat rate as a general incentive for participating 
in an experiment inside the MRI scanner, which can be noisy, cramped, and otherwise 
uncomfortable. I also pay participants appropriate piece-rate compensation based on their 
performance, like the performance pay contracts described in Farrell et al. (2012), Gläscher et al. 
(2010), and Ballard and Knutson (2009). 
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5.3.3.3 Experimental Procedures 
Before entering the scanner, participants are screened for right-handedness (to ensure 
similar brain lateralization) and other prerequisite conditions for their participation (such as not 
being pregnant and not having pieces of metal in their bodies).52 In a separate room, participants 
are trained on using two five-key keyboards to manipulate the sandwich assembly task used by 
Farrell et al. (2012).53 The causal linkage between quality and price is not included in this 
practice session. Once participants are proficient at the mechanics of the task, they enter the 
scanner. The first localizer task is the task given to participants by Ballard and Knutson (2009).54 
This task measures neural activation during discounting stimuli as participants are offered 
rewards of various levels of magnitude and delay.55 I discuss how these results are used to test 
H1 in the next section. 
The second localizer task is the task used by Gläscher et al. (2010) in which participants 
demonstrate their tendency toward model-free or model-based reinforcement learning of a task. 
By performing this task, I gain a baseline observation of the brain region networks that activate 
during model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. This task entails navigating through 
a tree of images, and one must construct a mental model of this decision tree to maximize the 
outcome from the interrelated alternatives on this tree. I expect some participants to favor model-
free reinforcement learning and thus to be “non-learners.” In the below section, I discuss how 
data from this localizer task is used to test H2. 
                                                 
52 Upon completion of this proposed study, I will document the model number(s) for the MRI scanner(s) used. 
53 Each finger on one hand controls one of the five ingredient categories used by Farrell et al. (2012). Only two 
fingers are used on the other hand: first to indicate that the participant wishes to remove an ingredient and second to 
complete the order. 
54 Although I refer to these as the first and second localizer tasks, they are presented in a counterbalanced order. 
55 Because I also collect behavioral results from this localizer task, I could feasibly calculate participants’ irrational 
discounting factors, which I could then use to further test whether hyperbolic discounting behavior predicts behavior 
in Farrell et al.’s (2012) task. 
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After the two localizer tasks have been completed, participants complete the task used by 
Farrell et al. (2012). That is, participants simulate the assembly of sandwiches to meet customer 
orders that appear on the computer screen. The number of mistakes each participant makes in the 
current round affects the price participants receive per sandwich in the next round. I inform 
participants in the causal linkage condition of this causal linkage before they begin the task. 
After participants complete this task over several rounds, participants exit the scanner and 
complete a post-experiment questionnaire, including demographic questions. Participants are 
paid flat wages as well as any performance pay they earned from the second localizer task or the 
sandwich assembly task. Performance pay from the first localizer task is sent to participants after 
the delay specified in that task (see Ballard and Knutson 2009). 
5.3.3.4 Planned Analysis of Localizer Tasks 
I use the two localizer tasks to test H1 and H2, respectively. As explained above, these 
localizer tasks are chosen because they engage thought processes that correlate to H1 and H2. 
Based on results from the first localizer task, I can locate brain regions that activate when 
participants irrationally discount future rewards. From there, I compare activation during the 
Farrell et al. (2012) task to these hyperbolic discounting brain regions. If H1 is correct, these two 
sets of activation patterns should be more highly correlated in the no causal linkage condition 
than in the causal linkage condition. 
In the second localizer task, I expect participants’ behavioral results to divide them into 
two endogenous groups: learners and non-learners (see Gläscher et al. 2010). Based on H2, the 
non-learner group has a tendency to overuse model-free reinforcement learning rather than 
develop a model. I expect these non-learners to also overuse model-free reinforcement learning 
in the no causal linkage condition, but I expect them to incorporate more model-based 
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reinforcement learning in the causal linkage condition. To test H2, I compare non-learner’s 
neural activation between the localizer task and the task used by Farrell et al. (2012). Support for 
H2 would come in the form of non-learners’ neural activation between the two tasks being more 















6.0  CONCLUSION 
Prior research suggests strategy maps can have broad effects on managers’ judgments and firm 
outcomes (e.g. Cheng and Humphreys 2012; Mastilak et al. 2012; Gimbert et al. 2010; Tayler 
2010). This line of prior research provides some limited evidence that a strategy map improves 
strategy revision judgments, with two studies providing especially relevant results. The first 
study, by Tayler (2010), provides evidence that receiving a strategy map can reduce managers’ 
biased reactions to new information that contradicts a strategy the managers themselves chose. 
However, his experiment does not directly test middle managers’ reaction to information that 
contradicts upper management’s chosen strategy.  
In Study 1, I use impression management theory and find a different motivation at play 
among middle managers, who generally do not create the firm’s strategy: middle managers more 
often withhold information the more unimpressive it is to upper management and information 
that contradicts the firm’s strategy is seen as relatively unimpressive. Among managers with two 
or more years of management experience, I find that receiving a strategy map helps mitigate this 
bias in what information they are willing to pass along. Furthermore, I find no evidence that 
receiving a strategy map ameliorates another negative behavior of middle managers: providing 
performance evaluations to subordinates that are biased against those providing information that 
contradicts the firm’s strategy and is thus unimpressive to upper management. My results also 
contribute to those of Tayler’s because his results suggest that a strategy map only mitigates 
managers’ biases when those managers choose their own performance measures. In contrast, I 
find that receiving a strategy map affects middle managers’ willingness to pass along 
unimpressive information even when they do not choose their own performance measures. 
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In the second highly relevant prior study, Cheng and Humphreys (2012) provide evidence 
that receiving a strategy map improves two judgments that are essential to revising the firm’s 
strategy based on new information. These two strategy revision judgments are, first, managers’ 
judgment of how relevant the new information is to revising the firm’s strategy (i.e. relevance 
judgments), and second, managers’ judgments of whether the firm’s strategy is appropriate in 
light of the new information (i.e. appropriateness judgments). However, Cheng and Humphreys 
only test strong causal linkages in their experiment. A separate study (see Webb 2004), suggests 
that weak causal linkages in a strategy map are less beneficial than strong causal linkages. Weak 
causal linkages are abundant in practice due to ignorance of the cause-and-effect relationships, 
philosophical differences among upper management agents creating the strategy map, or 
incentives to find strategic goals and accompanying performance measures that are easier to 
meet regardless of how well they fit together in causal linkages (Luft 2004). I find that a strategy 
map affects relevance judgments regardless of causal linkage strength, but only positively 
impacts appropriateness judgments when the causal linkages are strong. Among one subsample, 
weak causal linkages even worsen appropriateness judgments. 
At the end of each study, I detail limitations and potential extensions (see Sections 3.6 
and 4.5). In Section 5.0, I propose three additional studies that utilize neuroscience theory and 
neuroimaging techniques. These three proposals are especially important because neuroimaging 
tools are uniquely poised to expand and clarify existing theories about the effect of receiving a 
strategy map and about the mental processes that affect strategy revision judgments. This is 
because my two studies, like many prior studies on this topic, are broadly characterized as 
framing effects studies. That is, the primary research questions of my two studies tend to revolve 
around the effect of changing the way information is framed: in this case, by framing information 
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about the firm’s strategy as a strategy map. It can be difficult to extrapolate results from framing 
effects studies to the business world because seemingly minor differences in the way information 
is framed can dramatically alter the findings presented. The number of dimensions on which the 
framing of information can be changed is often so numerous that one cannot possibly control the 
context by clever experimental design alone. Neuroimaging studies, in contrast, promise to 
observe underlying neural processes, which provide especially useful insight into why a certain 
framing effect is found. Thus, with a greater understanding of the thought processes underlying 
an effect, one can better predict when it would be seen in practice. 
Indeed, the neuroimaging proposals in Section 5.0 include one proposed study that 
effectively examines thought processes underlying a previously found framing effect in the 
interest of making stronger predictions about its persistence over time. Farrell et al. (2012) find 
that receiving a strategy map improves how workers allocate effort between activities that 
benefit the firm (and the worker) in the short-term and activities that benefit the firm (and the 
worker) in the long-term. However, it is unclear from this study whether this effect would be 
expected to last long into the implementation of a strategy map. I propose a neuroimaging study 
that will provide evidence of neural processing, and thus thought processes, which helps provide 
a better prediction of how long a strategy map is likely to improve these effort allocations. 
In sum, my dissertation provides knowledge that is important for practice because 
managers face significant obstacles to properly revising the firm’s strategies when new 
information comes to light. Prior literature provides limited evidence suggesting a strategy map 
might help firms overcome these challenges. My findings contribute to this prior literature by 
providing more robust and detailed evidence of how receiving a strategy map helps managers’ 
strategy revision judgments. As such, these two studies provide guidance to practitioners on how 
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best to design a strategy map if the intended outcome is proper strategy revision. And lastly, my 
dissertation includes proposals that serve to point the way forward for research on strategy map 
judgment effects by including neuroscience theory and neuroimaging techniques. This, I believe, 
will be a particularly impactful tool in answering future questions about how a strategy map 
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